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WHEN TIME STANDS STILL: ELIMINATING
IMMIGRATION “DEATH SENTENCES”
Lori A. Nessel*

ABSTRACT
The nation prides itself on the notion of rebirth—the ideal that one can
leave their past behind, come to the United States, and seize the opportunities available to advance and remake oneself. Yet, when it comes to immigration law, neither the passage of time nor a life full of positive equities
ameliorates past wrongdoing or allows for future opportunities. In the
words of the Senate Subcommittee when Congress permanently removed
the statute of limitations for deportation from the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1952, “If the cause for exclusion existed at the time of entry, it is
believed that such aliens are just as undesirable at any subsequent time.”
Time stands still in significant and detrimental ways throughout our immigration law. An immigrant’s manner of entry into the United States can
result in a lifetime bar to due process in removal proceedings, and a finding
that an immigrant ever filed a “frivolous” asylum application will bar her
from any immigration benefit throughout her life, even if she withdrew the
application and procured no benefit through it. Detained noncitizens facing removal are routinely denied bond because of criminal charges that
have been filed against them, even absent any finding of guilt. This occurs
even if the accuser withdraws their complaint; the very fact that criminal
charges were brought signifies danger and results in ongoing detention.
In this Article, I examine a few of these provisions that result in lifetime
consequences, as well as the lack of a statute of limitations or laches defense in immigration law. After exploring jurisprudence and legislative history in each of these areas, I analyze the theory behind statutes of limitation
and laches defenses in other areas of law to argue for a statute of limitations for deportation proceedings, and for a time limit on penalties that
attach to a single bad act, like filing a frivolous asylum application. I also
argue that noncitizens should be entitled to the same presumption of innocence as in the criminal justice system with regards to bond determinations.
This Article incorporates a broader moral and policy-based argument that
after a certain period of time, a noncitizen’s membership in the nation is so
https://doi.org/10.25172/smulr.75.2.11.
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well-established and meaningful that deportation, or the denial of immigration benefits based on a past bad act, should no longer be possible.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Statutes of limitation are vital to the welfare of society and are favored
in the law. They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened
jurisprudence. They promote repose by giving security and stability to
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human affairs.”1

H

ILARIO Rivas-Melendrez was admitted to the United States as
a lawful permanent resident (LPR) in 1970.2 Ten years later, at
age twenty-one, he was convicted of statutory rape based on a
consensual sexual encounter with his seventeen-year-old girlfriend.3 Mr.
Rivas-Melendrez then served in the U.S. Navy, married his wife (also an
LPR), and fathered four U.S.-citizen children.4 In 2009, almost forty
years after Mr. Rivas-Melendrez was admitted to the United States, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) deported him based on this
conviction from nearly three decades prior.5
Jean Dumas6 fled Haiti and sought asylum without a lawyer in the
United States in 2002. He was unable to fully present his claim; the immigration judge denied him protection and ruled that his asylum application
was frivolous. He remained in the United States, started a family and a
business, and raised his U.S.-citizen children. He applied for temporary
protected status after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti but was barred because his initial asylum application had been deemed frivolous. He was
placed in removal proceedings and had a strong case for relief from removal but was ineligible because of the lifetime bar to immigration relief
after a finding that an asylum application was frivolous. After nearly
twenty years in the United States, he was deported and separated from
his children forever.
Although deeply flawed, the American justice system purports to further policy goals such as rehabilitation and redemption.7 The criminal
sentencing system involves weighing a bad act against other positive equities in the criminal defendant’s life. Clearly, none of this works in a fair
way, and a criminal defendant is often treated de facto the same way as
1. Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879).
2. Rivas-Melendrez v. Napolitano, 689 F.3d 732, 734 (7th Cir. 2012).
3. See id. at 734–35.
4. Id. at 735.
5. Id. at 734–35.
6. This Article uses the pseudonym “Jean Dumas” to respect the privacy of the asylum seeker. A detailed case summary is on file with the author.
7. See Joseph R. Biden Jr., A Proclamation on Second Chance Month, 2021, WHITE
HOUSE (Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/
2021/03/31/a-proclamation-on-second-chance-month-2021 [https://perma.cc/27ML-RD2L].
Although as critical legal theorists note, the criminal legal system could more accurately be
described as one based on punitive and carceral constructs. See, e.g., Kelly Lytle Hernández, Khalil Gibran Muhammad & Heather Ann Thompson, Introduction: Constructing
the Carceral State, 102 J. AM. HIST. 18, 18–19 (2015) (exploring how “policing and punishment and detention and deportation powerfully shape the U.S. economy and American
democracy”). As the authors note,
From the earliest hours of the nation’s formation, prison was conceived as a
modern intervention and as an Enlightenment ideal for the expression of
liberty by the negation of it . . . . [C]aptivity . . . was fundamental to American freedom from the beginning. Prison and slavery defined the boundaries
of citizenship and, in this sense, were two sides of the same coin.
Id. at 21.
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an immigrant facing deportation—as a bad actor that is unworthy of a
second chance. But there is increasing concern over the failures of the
criminal justice system and a growing movement seeking to ameliorate
the barriers to reentry after incarceration.8 Yet when it comes to immigration, the fact that someone has violated a civil law by entering without
permission or overstaying a visa can result in deportation9 at any time.
Moreover, an immigrant can commit a crime, complete his or her sentence, have the conviction expunged from his or her record, and still be
subject to deportation in the future.10 This raises deep questions about
how immigrants are viewed in our legal regime.
The United States also prides itself on the notion of rebirth—the ideal
that one can come to America without anything but seize the opportunities available to advance and remake oneself. Yet when it comes to immigration law, one bad act can never be undone, even though the “bad act”
is oftentimes not even criminal.11 In the words of the Senate Judiciary
Committee when Congress removed the statute of limitations for deportation from the Immigration and Nationality Act, “If the cause for exclusion existed at the time of entry, it is believed that such aliens are just as
undesirable at any subsequent time as they are within the [five] years
after entry.”12
The unforgiving nature of immigration law is well-known.13 But the
8. See, e.g., Annelies Goger, David J. Harding & Howard Henderson, Prisoner Reentry, in A BETTER PATH FORWARD FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 72, 72 (Brookings-Am. Enter.
Inst. Working Grp. on Crim. Just. Reform ed., 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Better-Path-Forward_Brookings-AEI-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2ENJ-RLYF] (“Eliminating racial disparities in our criminal justice system and improving
reentry outcomes requires a wholesale rethinking of our orientation toward criminal justice, rather than piecemeal reforms or isolated new programs.” The report calls for
“mov[ing] away from a policy framework that focuses on punishment as a tool for controlling risk in favor of a focus on human rights, harm reduction, and the social, political, and
economic reintegration of those who have been incarcerated.”).
9. Congress replaced the term “deportation” with “removal” in 1996, see Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104208, div. C, § 308(e), 110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009–619 to 3009–621 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.), although deportability grounds continue to exist in the Immigration and Nationality Act, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227. Because the term “deportation” continues to be widely used and recognized, this Article utilizes it in place of the more formal
term “removal.”
10. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (defining the term “conviction” in the immigration
context to be “a formal judgment of guilt of the alien entered by a court or, if adjudication
of guilt has been withheld, where—(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien
has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a
finding of guilt, and (ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed”). Convictions that are expunged, “vacated[,] or
set aside for rehabilitative purposes . . . or solely for the purpose of avoiding immigration
consequences” are still considered convictions for immigration purposes. HILLEL R.
SMITH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45151, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 26 (2021) (footnote omitted).
11. See ALISON SISKIN, ANDORRA BRUNO, BLAS NUNEZ-NETO, LISA M. SEGHETTI &
RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL33351, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 8–9 (2006).
12. S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 389 (1950).
13. See, e.g., John F. Gossart, Jr., Lady Liberty Blows Out Her Torch: New Immigration Law Is Unforgiving and Far More Restrictive, 27 U. BALT. L.F. 25, 25 (1997) (the
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lack of constitutional protections is often linked to the
(mis)characterization of immigration law as civil rather than criminal.14
Casting immigration law as civil has resulted in a regime in which, despite
the dire consequences of deportation, immigrants in removal proceedings
lack the right to free counsel and protection against ex post facto laws or
cruel and unusual punishment.15 Although scholars and courts have long
questioned the viability of this distinction, particularly in light of the increasing criminalization of immigration law, statutes of limitation are embedded in criminal, civil, and administrative law regimes alike.16
For example, under 28 U.S.C. § 2462, the general statute of limitations
that governs civil penalty enforcement actions, the federal government
must file suit “within five years from the date when the claim first accrued” unless otherwise specified by Congress.17 The doctrine of laches
also protects individuals from the inequities that would otherwise occur if
a civil claim could be sprung upon them at any time.18
In contrast, there is no statute of limitations or laches defense in immigration law.19 The government can, and increasingly does, initiate deportation proceedings against long-time, law-abiding members of society
based on actions that occurred long ago.20 This notion of time standing
still is woven into other aspects of immigration law as well. For example,
an immigrant’s manner of entry into the United States can result in a
lifetime bar to due process in removal proceedings,21 and a finding that
an immigrant ever filed a “frivolous” asylum application will bar her from
any immigration benefit throughout her life, even if she withdrew the application and procured no benefit from it.22 Finally, detained noncitizens
former immigration judge describes the 1996 overhaul of the immigration law as “cruel,
harsh, insensitive and inflexible”).
14. See, e.g., AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, TWO SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE: HOW THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM FALLS SHORT OF AMERICAN IDEALS OF JUSTICE 2 (2013), https://
www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/
aic_twosystemsofjustice.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5ZX-ENLL].
15. See id. at 2–3.
16. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (statute of limitations for non-capital, criminal offenses); 28
U.S.C. § 2462 (statute of limitations for the enforcement of any civil penalty or forfeiture).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2462.
18. See SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct.
954, 960 (2017) (first citing Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 667–68,
678 (2014); and then citing 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.3(5), at 89 (2d ed.
1993)).
19. AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, supra note 14, at 4.
20. See id. One notable exception is the statutory provision that limits deportation for
a single crime involving moral turpitude to those minor crimes committed within five years
of admission to the country. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). This provision provides that
“[a]ny alien who—(I) is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within
five years . . . after the date of admission, and (II) is convicted of a crime for which a
sentence of one year or longer may be imposed, is deportable.” Id.
21. Immigrants from specified countries are permitted to enter the United States for
ninety days without the need for a visa. See 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a). However, they are required
to waive any right to challenge their deportation, see id. § 1187(b), and courts have held
that this waiver of due process applies indefinitely, see Ferry v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 1117,
1128–29 (10th Cir. 2006); Nose v. Att’y Gen., 993 F.2d 75, 78–79 (5th Cir. 1993).
22. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.20(a)–(c), (f) (2021).
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facing removal are routinely denied bond because of criminal charges
that have been filed against them, even absent any finding of guilt.23
Again, this is true even if the accuser withdraws their complaint; the very
fact that criminal charges were brought signifies danger and ongoing
detention.24
In this Article, I examine a few of these provisions that result in lifetime consequences, as well as the lack of a statute of limitations or laches
defense in immigration law. After exploring jurisprudence and legislative
history in each of these areas, I analyze the theory behind statutes of
limitations and laches defenses in other areas of law to argue for a statute
of limitations for deportation proceedings, and for a time limit on penalties that attach to a single bad act, like filing a frivolous asylum application. I also argue that noncitizens should be entitled to the same
presumption of innocence as in the criminal justice system with regards to
bond determinations. This Article also incorporates a broader moral and
policy-based argument that after a certain period of time, a noncitizen’s
membership in the nation is so well-established and meaningful that deportation, or the denial of immigration benefits based on a past bad act,
should no longer be possible. Indeed, our nation’s first immigration laws
contained a statute of limitations on deportation, and there are still remnants of prior laches-based defenses sprinkled throughout the area of law.
Arguing for a return to a statute of limitations allows for engagement in
an important and timely scholarly debate on the meaning of membership
and citizenship.
Part II of this Article provides a historical overview of statutes of limitation in immigration law and other areas of civil, criminal, and administrative law. Part III broadens the lens to include other unforgiving aspects
of immigration law and practices that result in lifetime consequences for a
particular action. Specifically, Part III explores the lifetime bar to immigration benefits if a noncitizen is found to have submitted a frivolous asylum application. It also examines the Visa Waiver Program and its
requirement that an applicant permanently waive their due process
rights, as well as immigration judges’ practice of denying bond to detained noncitizens based on arrests that have not resulted in convictions
or charges that were dropped. Part IV analyzes the way in which immigration law’s unforgiving approach to past acts is at odds with important
societal notions of rehabilitation, and the role of rehabilitation in criminal
23. See IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., REPRESENTING CLIENTS IN BOND HEARINGS:
AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE 7 (2017), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/
bond_practice_guide-20170919.pdf [https://perma.cc/DK5T-T5P6].
24. See reports of this happening routinely with immigration judges in New Jersey (on
file with author); see also HAFSA S. MANSOOR & KATHERINE COMLY, SETON HALL UNIV.
SCH. OF L., A LONG TIME COMING: HOW THE IMMIGRATION BOND AND DETENTION SYSTEM CREATED TODAY’S COVID-19 TINDERBOX 8–9 (2020), https://law.shu.edu/docs/publications/clinics/how-immigration-bond-and-detention-system-created-todays-covid-19tinderbox.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HL9-N6PP]; IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., supra note 23,
at 7 (“Bond determinations are discretionary and the immigration judges can attach significance to arrests even if they did not ultimately result in convictions.”).
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sentencing. It also looks at the immigration regime’s reliance on temporal
considerations in other parts of the statutory scheme. Part IV also employs a critical race lens to examine the ways in which the criminalization
of immigrants has led to the widespread detention of immigrants of color.
While noting that broader reforms are necessary, Part IV argues that
adopting a statute of limitations for deportation would be a significant
step in the move to limit the carceral state. Part V argues for adoption of
a statute of limitations on deportation and urges reconsideration of the
prevailing view that the five-year statute of limitations for civil enforcement actions does not apply to deportation. Arguing that deportation is a
punitive sanction for violation of a civil law provision, Part V contends
that deportation fits squarely within the existing statute of limitations.
However, recognizing that courts have held to the contrary, Part VI ultimately proposes a five-year statute of limitations on deportation if the
government has been aware of the noncitizen’s unauthorized status. In
cases in which the government has been unaware, Part VI proposes a tenyear statute of limitations. Part VII ultimately concludes that length of
time and ties to the United States outweigh any government interest in
deportation.
II. MEANING AND PURPOSE OF STATUTES OF LIMITATION
Statutes of limitation exist in all areas of domestic law in order to further important procedural, evidentiary, and equity-based norms. In enacting statutes of limitation, Congress was motivated by a “concern that
after the passage of time ‘evidence has been lost, memories have faded,
and witnesses have disappeared.’”25 As Justice Marshall explained when
writing on behalf of a unanimous Court, “The statute of limitations establishes a deadline after which the defendant may legitimately have peace
of mind; it also recognizes that after a certain period of time it is unfair to
require the defendant to attempt to piece together his defense to an old
claim.”26 Because imposing time limits serves such important policy purposes, only the most serious crimes, such as kidnapping and murder, carry
no statute of limitations.27
This strongly held notion that fairness requires some limit on when an
action can be brought is woven into the fabric of criminal and civil laws
alike. In studying this topic, the Presidential Commission on Immigration
and Naturalization traced this bedrock principle back to ancient traditions in the Anglo-American legal system.28
25. 3M Co. (Minn. Mining & Mfg.) v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453, 1457 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349
(1944)).
26. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751 (1980).
27. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31253, STATUTE OF LIMITATION IN
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES: AN OVERVIEW 1–2 (2017).
28. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION, WHOM WE SHALL
WELCOME: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION 197–98 (1953); see also discussion infra notes 58–73 and accompanying text.
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Although it may sound far-fetched to suggest that the government
should be prevented from initiating deportation proceedings after a certain period of time, U.S. immigration law did in fact include a statute of
limitations until 1952.29 In reality, the United States’ regulation of its borders progressed from an open borders policy30 to exclusion grounds,31
and then to a one-year time limit if the government wanted to deport a
noncitizen who should have been excluded initially.32 It was only when
the United States initiated deportation as a punishment for post-entry
conduct that the period for the government to initiate deportation proceedings was lengthened to three and then five years, and ultimately removed entirely in 1952.33
As set forth above, Congressional concern with immigration was initially limited to excluding certain persons from entering the country,
rather than deporting anyone from within the nation.34 Even when Congress later enacted deportation grounds, its focus was on deporting those
who had entered in violation of exclusion grounds (namely contract labor
laws).35 Because the deportation was intended to be a remedy for allowing entrance to someone who should have been excluded at the border, the deportation ground contained a one-year statute of limitations.36
In 1917, Congress broadened both the grounds for deportation and the
time frame in which proceedings could be initiated.37 Under the Immigration Act of 1917, noncitizens who entered the United States in violation
of law were subject to deportation only if proceedings were commenced
against them within five years after the improper entry.38 In 1924, Congress once again broadened the grounds for deportation.39 This time,
however, Congress did not specify a statute of limitations for the additional deportation grounds.40 It was not until 1952 that Congress eliminated all statutes of limitations for deportation.41
Immigration law has been referred to as a “window into the national
29. See infra notes 30, 34–41 and accompanying text.
30. See Early American Immigration Policies, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.
https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/our-history/overview-of-ins-history/early-american-immigration-policies [https://perma.cc/D4PW-55JL] (stating that the United States had open
borders for approximately its first 100 years).
31. See infra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 37–41 and accompanying text.
34. See Immigration Act of 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214.
35. See Act of Oct. 19, 1888, ch. 1210, 25 Stat. 565, 566 (directing the return within one
year after entry of any immigrant who had landed in violation of the contract labor laws).
36. See id.; Immigration Act of 1891, ch. 551, § 11, 26 Stat. 1084, 1086.
37. See Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-301, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889.
38. Id.
39. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, § 14, 43 Stat. 153, 162.
40. See id.
41. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 241, 66
Stat. 163, 204–08 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231); PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION, supra note 28, at 198.
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psyche.”42 The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act was enacted at the
height of the Red Scare, a period of intense fear of communism and of
outsiders.43 In light of the climate of fear at the time, it is not surprising
that the 1952 Act was restrictive. But even within this climate, President
Harry Truman vetoed the bill, warning that it “substitute[ed] totalitarian
vengeance for democratic justice.”44
Specifically addressing the bill’s revocation of the statute of limitations
for deportation, President Truman warned,
Some of the new grounds of deportation which the bill would provide are unnecessarily severe. Defects and mistakes in admission
would serve to deport at any time because of the bill’s elimination,
retroactively as well as prospectively, of the present humane provision barring deportations on such grounds five years after entry.45
Indeed, President Truman was prescient in his warning that the bill’s approach to freezing noncitizens in time and punishing them for past acts
would only worsen societal pressures. For example, he warned, “Narcotic
drug addicts would be deportable at any time, whether or not the addiction was culpable, and whether or not cured. The threat of deportation
would drive the addict into hiding beyond the reach of cure, and the danger to the country from drug addiction would be increased.”46
The 1952 Act also retained the national origins quota system; included
new harsh provisions for deportation, exclusion, and denaturalization;
and curtailed hardship-based relief.47 In opposing the legislation, thenSenator John F. Kennedy, referred to the Act as “‘the most blatant piece
of discrimination’ in history.”48
Notwithstanding President Truman’s opposition, Congress overrode
the veto and enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.49 Removing the statute of limitations for deportation actions was just one way
in which Congress acted to tighten the immigration regime.
42. Linda Greenhouse, Immigration Bill: Looking for Skills and Good English, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 10, 1988), https://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/10/weekinreview/redefiningboundaries-who-may-come-immigration-bill-looking-for-skills-good.html [https://perma.cc/
72UK-ESDJ].
43. See McCarthyism and the Red Scare, UNIV. OF VA. MILLER CTR., https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/educational-resources/age-of-eisenhower/mcarthyism-redscare [https://perma.cc/UPN2-2F27]; The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (The
McCarran-Walter Act), OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/milestones/19451952/immigration-act [https://perma.cc/2GMM-XVTY].
44. President Harry S. Truman, Veto of Bill to Revise the Laws Relating to Immigration, Naturalization, and Nationality, 1952 PUB. PAPERS 441, 445 (June 25, 1952). President
Truman noted, “The bill would make it even more difficult to enter our country. Our resident aliens would be more easily separated from homes and families under grounds of
deportation, both new and old, which would specifically be made retroactive.” Id. at 444.
45. Id. at 445.
46. Id.
47. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat.
163.
48. See 109 CONG. REC. 12,047 (1963).
49. Vetoes by President Harry S. Truman, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/vetoes/TrumanHS.htm [https://perma.cc/K53V-3YJV].
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However, as the political climate changed in the 1960s, many of the
harshest aspects of the 1952 immigration law were ameliorated. For example, the domestic advancements of the Civil Rights Era seeped into
the immigration regime, resulting in Congress’s revocation of national origin-based quotas.50 The improved domestic economic outlook in the
1980s led Congress to enact the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986, allowing for amnesty for millions of undocumented immigrants.51
On the other hand, the domestic War on Drugs led to multiple pieces of
legislation in 1996 aimed at dramatically widening the grounds for deportation and narrowing the avenues for discretionary relief for noncitizens
who commit crimes.52 Additionally, the 9/11 terrorist attack heightened
national security concerns and led to further restrictions in immigration
law.53 Over the past twenty-five years, Congress and DHS have criminalized immigration law and practice to such an extent that it bears greater
similarity to criminal law than civil law today.54 Along with this criminalization, the detention regime has grown exponentially, resulting in a system in which the majority of federal criminal prosecutions are for
immigration violations55 and approximately 500,000 immigrants are detained per year.56 However, notwithstanding the dramatic ebbs and flows
50. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, sec. 11,
§§ 221–22, 79 Stat. 911, 918 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1201–02).
51. See Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603,
§§ 201–02, 302–03, 100 Stat. 3359, 3394–3405, 3417–31 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). This piece of legislation also contained employer sanctions
in an effort to decrease the incentive for undocumented migration going forward. See id.
§§ 101–03, 100 Stat. at 3360–80 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 29, and
42 U.S.C.).
52. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§§ 401, 411–14, 421–23, 110 Stat. 1214, 1258–73 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 8 U.S.C.); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, §§ 341–53, 110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009–635 to 3009–641
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
53. See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272. The Act allows for, among other things, the arrest, detention, and
deportation of noncitizens who are believed to be members of, have raised funds for, or
provided some kind of material support to an organization designated as terrorist by the
Secretary of State, or to an organization that is not on the list of terrorist groups but has
engaged in some sort of violent activity that would make such organization eligible for
inclusion on the Secretary’s list. See id. §§ 411–12, 115 Stat. at 345–50. Moreover, the Act
authorizes the continued detention of noncitizens who have never been convicted of a
crime if the Attorney General “certifies” that he has “reasonable grounds to believe” that
their release will endanger “the national security of the United States or the safety of the
community or any person.” See id. at § 411, 115 Stat. at 350–51.
54. See WALTER A. EWING, DANIEL E. MARTÍNEZ & RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 14–19
(2015), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/
the_criminalization_of_immigration_in_the_united_states.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZ78ZCUY].
55. See AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, PROSECUTING PEOPLE FOR COMING TO THE UNITED
STATES 2 (2021), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/
prosecuting_people_for_coming_to_the_united_states.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJU7-J4KZ].
56. Immigration Detention 101, DETENTION WATCH NETWORK, https://
www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/issues/detention-101 [https://perma.cc/7KNS-ZJ6N]
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of restrictions in the immigration regime along with national security, political, and economic trends, the complete removal of the statute of limitations has remained unaltered since 1952.57
Shortly after Congress overrode President Truman’s veto and enacted
the nation’s first comprehensive immigration statute in 1952, the President formed a Commission on Immigration and Naturalization to conduct hearings and assess the new immigration law.58 The Commission
concluded that “[t]he immigration and nationality law embodies policies
and principles that are unwise and injurious to the nation . . . [and] should
be reconsidered and revised from beginning to end.”59 The Commission
had particularly harsh criticism for the removal of a statute of limitations
from the 1952 Act, noting “[t]hat it is wrong to keep the threat of punishment indefinitely over the head of one who breaks the law is a principle
deeply rooted in the ancient traditions of our legal system.”60 As the
Commission pointed out, “[C]riminal prosecutions, except for capital offenses, such as murder and treason, [are required to] be brought within a
fixed period of time or not at all.”61
Other than capital offenses, prosecutions for all other federal crimes
generally must commence within five years.62 This general statute of limitations covers crimes such as bribery, counterfeiting, forgery, extortion,
mail fraud, perjury, and robbery.63 However, the five-year general statute
of limitations does not apply if another statute provides otherwise.64 For
example, if the offense involves major fraud against the United States, a
seven-year statute of limitations applies.65
The Commission further found that, in rescinding the statute of limitations, the 1952 Act created a situation in which a noncitizen “who entered
the United States 25 years ago, . . . whose entry involved a purely technical violation,” and who had been “immun[e] from deportation for the last
(“The average daily population of detained immigrants increased from approximately
7,000 in 1994, to 19,000 in 2001, and to over 50,000 in 2019. After three decades of expansion, the detention system now captures and holds as many as 500,000 immigrants each
year.”); see also Immigration Detention and Enforcement, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR.,
[https://perma.cc/BF56-D388] (“The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) manages
the largest immigration detention system in the world and spends more on immigration
enforcement than on all other federal enforcement agencies combined.” (citation
omitted)).
57. See infra notes 77–84 and accompanying text, for a discussion of failed legislative
attempts to reintroduce a statute of limitations for deportation.
58. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION, supra note 28, at
xi–xii.
59. Id. at 263.
60. Id. at 197.
61. Id.; see also DOYLE, supra note 27 (“There is no statute of limitations for federal
crimes punishable by death, nor for certain federal crimes of terrorism, nor for certain
federal sex offenses. Prosecution for most other federal crimes must begin within five years
of the commitment of the offense.”).
62. DOYLE, supra note 27, at 2 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3282).
63. See id. at 17–25.
64. See id. at 2; 18 U.S.C. § 3282.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1031(f).
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20 years,” would now be subject to deportation.66 Noting that this threatens the security of many noncitizens and their families, the Commission
remarked, “Their immunities have been removed, and they may be torn
out of their accustomed places in the communities in which they live, no
matter how exemplary their conduct over a long period of years.”67
Moreover, “Instead of being a ‘humanitarian’ measure, as the Congressional Conferees on the Act of 1952 characterized it, the new act actually
restores the threat of cruel and inhuman punishment for offenses long
since forgiven.”68
The Commission also noted Congress’s disparate treatment of prosecutions for “aggravated criminal violations of the immigration laws” and
“deportation proceedings for such violations—as well as for infractions,”
which do not even carry criminal law consequences.69 Although “prosecutions for aggravated criminal violations of the immigration laws [at the
time, were] subject to a [three]-year statute of limitations,” deportation
proceedings brought as a result of a violation or infraction of immigration
laws “are governed by no statute of limitations, and may be brought more
than 20 or 40 years after a [noncitizen] enter[s] the United States.”70 In
the words of the Commission,
No one has suggested any sound reason why the purpose of limitations—recognition of the unfairness involved in requiring a person to
make a defense long after the event, when it is difficult or impossible
to assemble witnesses and evidence—does not apply to immigration
matters at least with equal force as to prosecutions for serious
crimes.71
As noted by the Commission, “There is a fundamental public purpose
which is served by statutes of limitations for crimes and in civil actions.
This is just as important an objective of law enforcement as the avoidance
of violation of law.”72 Ultimately, the Commission recommended a tenyear statute of limitations, finding that “a period of [ten] years within
which proceedings must be brought after the commission of an act for
which deportation is provided is ample for the Government to ascertain
that a violation ha[s] occurred and to take action against the offender.”73
On April 6, 1953, President Dwight Eisenhower wrote to Senator Arthur Watkins, Chairman of the Immigration Subcommittee of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, in connection with proposed hearings.74 The President acknowledged that the “existing legislation contains injustices,” including “[d]eportation provisions that permit an alien to be deported at
66. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION, supra note 28, at 198.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 101 CONG. REC. S12,287–88 (daily ed. July 30, 1955) (statement of Sen. Arthur
Watkins).
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any time after entry, irrespective of how long ago he was involved, after
entry, in any action or affiliation designated as ‘subversive.’”75 The President suggested that “the Committee on the Judiciary [should] investigate
these complaints and the other critical comments which ha[d] developed
as a result of the operation of the immigration and naturalization law of
1952 with a view to achieving legislation which would be fair and just to
all.”76
While there have been attempts to impose temporal limitations on deportation over the years, none of them have succeeded. For example, in
1961, Senator Jacob Javits and five other senators proposed a bill aimed
at overhauling the Immigration and Nationality Act.77 Among its provisions, it contained a ten-year statute of limitations for deportation actions.78 In recommending adoption of the bill, the Senate subcommittee
noted that ten years is twice as long as the statute of limitations for federal felonies and would provide ample time for the government to take
action.79 The subcommittee implored Congress to “bear in mind that the
national self-interest is best served when the [statutory] restrictions [on
immigration] are both sensible and fair in operation, and consistent with
our heritage of respect for individual human integrity.”80 Unfortunately,
the bill never made it out of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.81
Sixty years later, in 2021, a bill entitled the New Way Forward Act was
introduced in the House of Representatives.82 Among its provisions, the
bill includes a five-year statute of limitations for removal proceedings
based on criminal grounds.83 While a statute of limitations for criminal
removal grounds would “[a]dvance racial justice and address obstacles to
equal justice in the criminal legal system by limiting deportation for drug
convictions and other offenses that result from enforcement that dispro75. Id. at 12,288.
76. Id.
77. See S. 551, 87th Cong. (1961).
78. Id. § 206 (“No alien shall be deported by reason of any conduct occurring more
than ten years prior to the institution of deportation proceedings.”).
79. 109 CONG. REC. S12,052 (daily ed. July 2, 1963).
80. Id. at S12,048.
81. See id.
82. See New Way Forward Act, H.R. 536, 117th Cong. (2021).
83. Id. § 201. The bill proposes amending § 239(d) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229(d), to add the following:
(3)(A) Notwithstanding paragraph (2), any removal proceeding against an
alien previously admitted to the United States for being within a class of
deportable aliens described in section 237(a)(2), or within a class of inadmissible aliens described in section 212(a)(2), shall not be entertained unless
commenced not later than the date that is five years after the date on which
the alien became deportable or inadmissible.
(B) This paragraph shall apply to any removal proceeding resulting in an
order of removal before the date of the enactment of the New Way Forward
Act as if in effect on the date on which the removal proceeding was
commenced.
Id.
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portionately targets communities of color,”84 it would do nothing to ameliorate the harshness imposed by the myriad of other grounds for
removal.
III. OTHER WAYS NONCITIZENS ARE FROZEN IN TIME BY
IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY
A. THE LIFETIME BAR

FOR A

FRIVOLOUS ASYLUM APPLICATION

It is impossible to overstate the consequences of filing a frivolous asylum application. If deemed frivolous, an asylum application becomes a
noncitizen’s defining immutable characteristic and eclipses any future aspirations they might have. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit captured this severity when it stated that a frivolous asylum
application amounts to a “death sentence” for an asylum seeker hoping
to find permanent, legal residence in the United States.85
Congress first enacted this frivolity-based lifetime bar to immigration
benefits as part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.86 The legislation was motivated by widespread
media reporting that immigrants were filing frivolous asylum applications
in order to pursue employment authorization and delay their deportation.87 But the harshness of the penalty is hard to reconcile with this concern. The frivolousness bar has been described as “‘[o]ne of the “most
extreme provisions” in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996,’ and, once imposed, it ‘may not be waived
under any circumstances.’”88 The Third Circuit implored the immigration
judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to “at least consider
the consequences of the draconian penalty attached to a finding that the
application for asylum is frivolous, particularly where . . . the finding may
cause the family structure of the applicant to be permanently ruptured.”89
While Congress has evidenced its concern with frivolous applications in
other areas of administrative law, it has never imposed the unforgiving
84. Introducing: New Way Forward Act, IMMIGRANT JUST. NETWORK [https://
perma.cc/5PH8-4CT8].
85. Luciana v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 502 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting
Muhanna v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 582, 588 (3d Cir. 2005)).
86. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, sec. 604, § 208(d)(6), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-694 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6)).
87. Andrea Rogers, Comment, Exploitation v. Expulsion: The Use of Expedited Removal in Asylum Cases as an Answer to a Compromised System, 24 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 785, 793–97 (1998) (thoroughly documenting the perfect storm of economic and national security concerns that were given wide attention in the media and resulted in congressional action in overhauling the Immigration and Nationality Act).
88. Luciana, 502 F.3d at 278 (quoting Muhanna, 399 F.3d at 588)); see also E. Lea
Johnston, An Administrative “Death Sentence” for Asylum Seekers: Deprivation of Due
Process Under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6)’s Frivolousness Standard, 82 WASH. L. REV. 831, 833
(2007) (noting that the frivolousness bar “applies regardless of any future developments in
the asylum applicant’s home country or personal life that would otherwise provide a basis
for granting immigration benefits”).
89. Luciana, 502 F.3d at 284.
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penalties that attach when asylum is at issue. For example, pursuant to
the U.S. Tax Code, an individual is subject to a $5,000 penalty for filing a
frivolous tax return.90 Moreover, tax law specifies that, before the monetary penalty can be levied, the Internal Revenue Service must give the
filer notice of the frivolousness finding and thirty days within which to
withdraw the submission without any penalty.91 Similarly, one can seek to
withdraw an application for Social Security benefits, and if granted, the
application is treated as if it were never made.92 In contrast, no such opportunity to withdraw an asylum application upon notice of a frivolousness finding exists in the immigration context.93
Similarly, other areas of civil law contain penalties for filing frivolous
claims but do not impose a lifetime bar or preclude the claimant from
filing good-faith petitions in the future. For example, under the Civil
Rights Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, frivolous claims may
be dismissed, and the plaintiff risks being ordered to pay fees to the defendant.94 But bringing such claims does not preclude the plaintiff from
bringing legitimate claims in the future.95 Many state-level civil court systems similarly require that a party or attorney who is alleged to have filed
a frivolous claim be given notice and an opportunity to withdraw the
90. 26 U.S.C. § 6702(a). This provision provides the following:
A person shall pay a penalty of $5,000 if—
(1) such person files what purports to be a return of a tax imposed by this
title but which—
(A) does not contain information on which the substantial correctness of
the self-assessment may be judged, or
(B) contains information that on its face indicates that the self-assessment is substantially incorrect, and
(2) the conduct referred to in paragraph (1)—
(A) is based on a position which the Secretary has identified as frivolous
under subsection (c), or
(B) reflects a desire to delay or impede the administration of Federal tax
laws.
Id.
91. Id. § 6702(b)(3) ( “If the Secretary provides a person with notice that a submission
is a specified frivolous submission and such person withdraws such submission within 30
days after such notice, the penalty imposed under paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to such submission.”).
92. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., OMB NO. 0960-0015, FORM SSA-521: REQUEST FOR WITHDRAWAL OF APPLICATION 1 (2018), https://www.ssa.gov/forms/ssa-521.pdf [https://
perma.cc/J6JS-KJD2] (“If we approve [the request for withdrawal of your application], the
decision we made on your application will have no legal effect.”).
93. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6).
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (providing for the award of reasonable attorney’s fees
to the prevailing party on a civil rights claim); CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC, 578
U.S. 419, 422–23 (2016) (“When a defendant is the prevailing party on a civil rights claim,
the Court has held, district courts may award attorney’s fees if the plaintiff’s ‘claim was
frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless’ or if ‘the plaintiff continued to litigate after it
clearly became so.’” (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 422
(1978))); 42 U.S.C. § 12145(c) (If the Secretary has “reasonable cause to believe that any
relief granted under [the Americans with Disabilities Act] was fraudulently applied for, the
Secretary shall . . . cancel such relief” and “take such other action as the Secretary considers appropriate.”).
95. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12145(c), 2000e-5(k); CRST, 578 U.S. at 422–23.
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claim before any sanctions are imposed.96
As if the draconian penalties that already existed for frivolous asylum
applications were not enough, twenty-five years later, as part of the
Trump Administration’s efforts to dismantle asylum protection, DHS issued a new rule, effective January 11, 2021, which dramatically broadened
the definition of what constitutes a frivolous asylum application.97 Pursuant to the new rule, a fabrication no longer needs to be “deliberate[ ],”
and the definition of what constitutes a frivolous application now includes
an application that “[i]s filed without regard to the merits of the claim” or
“[i]s clearly foreclosed by applicable law.”98 This stands in stark contrast
with the way in which frivolity is interpreted in other contexts. Generally,
a claim is considered frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law
or in fact.”99 As courts have held, a frivolous finding is appropriate when
either: (1) “the ‘factual contentions are clearly baseless,’ such as when
allegations are the product of delusion or fantasy;” or (2) “the claim is
‘based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.’”100
In addition to broadening the definition of “frivolous” to potentially
include making a claim in an effort to advance the law, the BIA has also
held that withdrawing an application “does not preclude a finding that
the application [was] frivolous.”101 For example, in X-M-C-, the BIA held
that “the only action required to trigger a frivolousness inquiry is the filing of an asylum application.”102 Once that transpires, neither withdrawing the application nor recanting any false statement precludes a
frivolousness finding.103
Similarly, in Kulakchyan v. Holder, a panel of the Ninth Circuit upheld
the BIA’s finding that an Armenian national’s application for adjustment
of status was pretermitted by her previous filing of an asylum application
that was found to be frivolous.104 The panel afforded Chevron deference
to the BIA’s interpretation that 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6) allows a withdrawn
96. For example, in New Jersey, the Frivolous Claims Act (FCA) specifies that when a
party files a complaint, or takes a frivolous position in a case, the trial court can shift the
costs and fees associated with a response to the party or attorney that submitted the frivolous filing. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-59.1.a (West 2021). But before this can happen, the
party or attorney accused of making the frivolous filing is given an opportunity to correct
their error. N.J. CT. R. 1:4-8(b)(1) (West 2022). The FCA works in conjunction with Rule
1:4-8 of the New Jersey Rules of Court and permits a sanction only if the offending party
refuses to withdraw the frivolous pleading after being given a written notice. See id. (requiring that an FCA application be made in compliance with the rules for attorney
sanction).
97. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.20(c) (2021).
98. Id. § 1208.20(a), (c).
99. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
100. See, e.g., Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (quoting
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327).
101. X-M-C-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 322, 322 (B.I.A. 2010).
102. Id. at 324.
103. Id. at 326.
104. Kulakchyan v. Holder, 730 F.3d 993, 995–96 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
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asylum application to sustain a frivolousness finding.105
The dramatic difference in the way that frivolous applications are
treated in the asylum context as compared with other administrative and
civil law regimes again raises the question of why there is a presumption
of unworthiness that permeates the immigration regime. It is true that the
immigration courts are incredibly backlogged,106 and frivolous asylum applications presumably cause further delay within this system. But the
same is true of the Social Security system.107 There are also countless
other checks on asylum claims that may be deemed frivolous. For example, filing a frivolous asylum application no longer allows for immediate
employment authorization,108 as was the case when Congress enacted the
lifetime bar to immigration benefits for frivolous asylum applications.109
Retaining a lifetime bar for asylum applications that are deemed frivolous, along with broadening the standard for frivolity, and holding that
withdrawing the claim has no impact, can only be seen as punitive
sanctions.
B. VISA WAIVER PROGRAM
Congress first enacted the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) on a pilot basis
in 1986,110 and it became a permanent part of the immigration law in
2000.111 This program authorizes noncitizens from forty countries to enter
the United States for business or tourism for up to ninety days without a
visa, in exchange for those countries offering reciprocal privileges to U.S.
citizens.112 Although being able to travel without the necessity of a visa
has many advantages, the program requires anyone entering through the
VWP to permanently forego certain rights and privileges in the United
States.113 For example, if a noncitizen seeks to enter through the VWP
105. Id. at 996; see also M-S-B-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 872, 872, 879 (B.I.A. 2016) (holding that
an untimely asylum application can still be deemed frivolous).
106. The American Immigration Lawyers Association states that the current immigration court backlog includes 1.3 million cases, “with an average wait time exceeding four
years” for hearings. Featured Issue: Immigration Court Backlog and Reprioritization, AM.
IMMIGR. LAWS. ASS’N (June 10, 2021), [https://perma.cc/9H4V-DSXU].
107. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., SOC. SEC. ADMIN., A-02-17-50240, FISCAL YEAR 2016
INSPECTOR GENERAL STATEMENT ON THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION’S MAJOR
MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE CHALLENGES 3 (2016), https://oig-files.ssa.gov/audits/
full/A-02-17-50240_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DDJ-7GUX] (reporting that the Social Security Administration’s “pending hearings backlog grew 59 percent, from 705,367 cases at the
end of FY 2010 to 1,122,014 at the end of FY 2016”).
108. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.7(a)(1)(ii) (2021) (“An applicant for asylum cannot apply for
initial employment authorization earlier than 365 calendar days after the date [U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services] or the immigration court receives the asylum
application.”).
109. See ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45539, IMMIGRATION: U.S. ASYLUM
POLICY 12–13 (2019).
110. ABIGAIL F. KOLKER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32221, VISA WAIVER PROGRAM
(2021).
111. See Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act, Pub. L. No. 106-396, sec. 101, § 217, 114
Stat. 1637, 1637 (2000) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1187).
112. 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(1)–(2); KOLKER, supra note 110.
113. See 8 U.S.C. § 1187(b).
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and is denied, there is no right to administrative or judicial review.114
Those who are admitted through the VWP lose the right to ever challenge a removal order or claim any form of relief from removal115 (other
than asylum, withholding of removal, or relief under the Convention
Against Torture).116
Courts have routinely upheld this waiver of due process, regardless of
the length of time that a VWP applicant spends in the United States or
the equities that accrue over the years. For example, in Bradley v. Attorney General of the United States, the VWP applicant was admitted to the
United States in 1996 and stayed beyond the permissible ninety days.117
Ten years later, he married a U.S. citizen, and the couple began the process for him to obtain lawful permanent resident status through his
wife.118 He was placed in removal proceedings and alleged that he did not
knowingly waive his rights when admitted.119 However, the Third Circuit
dismissed his challenge, finding that there was no prejudice.120 The court
reasoned that even assuming his waiver was made without knowledge, if
he had known of the consequences of the waiver, his choice would have
been to sign and waive his rights to due process or be summarily excluded.121 In other words, once a VWP applicant agrees to waive their
rights in order to be admitted, life stands still at that moment, regardless
of the length of time one has been in the United States or the life that one
has built.
Clearly, the VWP is intended to be mutually beneficial. The noncitizen
is able to avoid the oftentimes lengthy process of seeking a visa and can
easily be admitted to the United States for ninety days. In exchange, the
United States saves the administrative and fiscal costs associated with removal proceedings if the noncitizen fails to depart after ninety days.
However, as with so many immigration provisions, making this waiver of
due process rights lifelong is unnecessarily punitive. The lifetime bar to
due process is inconsistent with the reality that noncitizens who remain in
the United States build lives and establish significant ties, regardless of
their manner of entry.
C. DENIAL

OF

BOND BASED ON WITHDRAWN ALLEGATIONS
LED TO CRIMINAL CHARGES

THAT

In the context of detained immigrants seeking release on bond, immigration judges routinely deny applications, treating any past criminal act
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See id. § 1187(b)(1).
See id. § 1187(b)(2).
See Ferry v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 1117, 1123–25 (10th Cir. 2006).
Bradley v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 603 F.3d 235, 237 (3d Cir. 2010).
Id.
Id. at 238–40.
Id. at 240–41.
Id. at 240 (citing Bayo v. Napolitano, 593 F.3d 495, 506 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc)).
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or accusation as an indelible marker of danger.122 According to the U.S.
Supreme Court, “The mere fact that a man has been arrested has very
little, if any, probative value in showing that he has engaged in any misconduct. An arrest shows nothing more than that someone probably suspected the person apprehended of an offense.”123 But when it comes to
judging danger for purposes of bond, immigration judges routinely rely
on arrests, even if they did not lead to a conviction.124 Moreover,
“[b]ecause immigration court hearings, including bond, are administrative
proceedings governed by the executive branch, traditional due process
safeguards are absent.”125 In addition, the Federal Rules of Evidence do
not apply in immigration courts.126 This means that “hearsay or evidence
gathered in unconstitutional questioning, is generally admissible in immigration court.”127 This leads to a system in which immigration judges “inquire about and consider pending, unresolved criminal charges and
[often] rely on hearsay allegations (including allegations contained in police reports) that did not result in convictions.”128
In the analogous criminal bail determination setting, state regulations
specify that the judge can only consider the defendant’s criminal history
in as much as it contains convictions.129 Thus, many state judges are statutorily precluded from considering a defendant’s prior arrests if they did
122. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying discussion in the text; see also John
Washington, ICE Subverting Biden’s Priorities for Detention and Deportation, THE INTERCEPT (May 7, 2021, 9:59 AM), [https://perma.cc/AC3W-42TS]. “Lauren Major, managing
attorney at the American Friends Service Committee in New Jersey,” claims that “at least
four of the group’s clients have had requests to be released denied despite the fact that
their criminal charges have been dismissed.” Washington, supra. Major also specifies that
five other clients have had their bond requests “denied based on unproven pending criminal charges against them.” Id.
123. Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 241 (1957) (footnote omitted).
124. See, e.g., GABRIELA KAHRL, MICHELLE N. MENDEZ & MAUREEN A. SWEENEY,
PRESUMED DANGEROUS: BOND, REPRESENTATION, AND DETENTION IN THE BALTIMORE
IMMIGRATION COURT 8–9 (2019), https://cliniclegal.org/file-download/download/public/382
[https://perma.cc/N6BC-LWBV].
125. Id. at 3.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 4. Bond hearings before immigration judges are known as custody redetermination hearings and are governed by section 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, § 236, 8 U.S.C. § 1226; 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.19 (2021). Additional practice guidance is provided by the Immigration Court Practice Manual. See EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., IMMIGRATION
COURT PRACTICE MANUAL (2020), . According to the Manual,
In certain circumstances, an alien detained by the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) can be released from custody upon the payment of bond.
Initially, the bond is set by DHS. Upon the alien’s request, an Immigration
Judge may conduct a “bond hearing,” in which the Immigration Judge has
the authority to redetermine the amount of bond set by DHS.
Id. at 131–32. Moreover, the Manual states, “If the alien is eligible for bond, the Immigration Judge considers whether the alien’s release would pose a danger to property or persons, whether the alien is likely to appear for further immigration proceedings, and
whether the alien is a threat to national security.” Id. at 134.
129. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(1)(c) (McKinney 2022) (including “[t]he
principal’s criminal conviction record if any” among factors to be considered in setting bail
(emphasis added)).
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not result in convictions. By allowing immigration judges the discretion to
consider a noncitizen’s arrests and charges that have been dismissed or
withdrawn, the immigration regime freezes the noncitizen in a particular
moment of time, regardless of whether that moment even resulted in a
conviction.
IV. THE UNFORGIVING NATURE OF IMMIGRATION LAW IS
INCONSISTENT WITH THE AMERICAN LEGAL
SYSTEM
A. REHABILITATION PLAYS A ROLE IN PUNISHMENT AND
SENTENCING WITHIN THE CRIMINAL LEGAL SYSTEM
Rehabilitation has deep historical roots as a purpose behind punishment in the criminal legal context,130 although many scholars assert that
the true motivating impetus has always been punitive. The idea that punishment serves to rehabilitate dates back to the Bible and the writings of
ancient Greece.131 Rehabilitation was a popular component of the American criminal system until the 1970s when a consensus emerged that it was
ineffective in preventing future crime and allowed for too much discretion and inequality in sentencing.132 But rehabilitation has resurfaced as a
goal in punishment.133 In the words of Professor Edward Rubin, “Rehabilitation is the central premise of the modern prison as an institution; we
can no more repudiate it than we can repudiate national defense as the
basis for our military forces, or education as the basis for our schools, or
health care as the basis for our public hospitals.”134 When it comes to
sentencing goals, we see a “greatly reinvigorated interest in rehabilitative
programs, such as drug, mental health, and domestic violence courts, reentry programs, and a plethora of new community-based and institutional
treatment programs.”135
A review of Supreme Court jurisprudence relating to punishment in
the context of the Eighth Amendment also suggests that rehabilitation is
reemerging as a significant goal in punishment. In early Eighth Amendment decisions, the Supreme Court did not even mention rehabilitation
as a legitimate penological goal.136 Rather, the Court focused solely on
retribution and deterrence, with an occasional passing reference to incapacitation.137 For example, in Gregg v. Georgia, the Court stated that
“[t]he death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes: retribu130. See Meghan J. Ryan, Science and the New Rehabilitation, 3 VA. J. CRIM. L. 261,
265, 269 (2015).
131. Id. at 269.
132. Id. at 278–81.
133. Id. at 265, 289.
134. Edward L. Rubin, The Inevitability of Rehabilitation, 19 LAW & INEQ. 343, 344
(2001).
135. Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 2
(2006).
136. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
137. See, e.g., id. at 183 & n.28.
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tion and deterrence.”138 It was not until 1984 that the Court even recognized rehabilitation as a legitimate penological goal.139 And even when
rehabilitation was mentioned, the Court failed to engage in analysis as to
whether the punishment at issue furthered rehabilitation.140 For example,
in Ewing v. California, the plurality mentioned rehabilitation as one of
the primary purposes of punishment, but it didn’t analyze whether the
punishment at issue—twenty-five years to life imprisonment—served the
goal of rehabilitation like it did with respect to the goals of retribution
and deterrence.141
It was not until 2010 that the Court really analyzed rehabilitation as a
legitimate penological goal.142 In Graham v. Florida, the Court grappled
with whether the punishment of life without the possibility of parole was
unconstitutional for a nonhomicide crime committed by a juvenile offender.143 For the first time, the Court focused its Eighth Amendment
analysis on the theory of rehabilitation.144 According to the Court, giving
a juvenile a life-without-the-possibility-of-parole sentence communicates
the state’s belief that rehabilitation is impossible.145 Therefore, the Court
concluded that such a punishment could not serve the goal of rehabilitation and was cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment.146 This
attention to rehabilitation in the context of the Eighth Amendment was
unprecedented, reflecting a new emphasis on rehabilitation as a sentencing goal.
Rehabilitation also plays a significant role in criminal sentencing determinations in other contexts. For example, circuit courts have split as to
whether evidence of post-offense rehabilitation can play a role in downward sentencing under the federal guidelines.147 While the courts are still
grappling with the best way to incorporate evidence of rehabilitation into
138. Id. at 183; see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798–801 (1982).
139. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461, 477–78 (1984).
140. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25–27, 29–30 (2003). Of course, in the
context of the death penalty, rehabilitation cannot be served.
141. See id.
142. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71, 73–75 (2010).
143. See id. at 52–53.
144. See id. at 73–75.
145. Id. at 79.
146. Id. at 74.
147. Compare United States v. Thornton, 846 F.3d 1110, 1118–19 (10th Cir. 2017)
(“[T]he court may not lengthen a prison sentence for the purpose of exposing the offender
to the rehabilitative benefits of prison.”), and United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303,
1310 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that district court erred in considering rehabilitation for
sentencing), with United States v. Del Valle-Rodriguez, 761 F.3d 171, 174–75 (1st Cir.
2014) (stating that rehabilitation may be considered so long as it is not “being relied upon
either in deciding whether to incarcerate or in deciding the length of the incarcerative
sentence to be imposed”), and United States v. Schonewolf, 905 F.3d 683, 692 (3d Cir.
2018) (noting that judges may mention rehabilitation during sentence but may not impose
or lengthen a sentence “to further a rehabilitative aim”). In Tapia v. United States, the
Supreme Court held that federal judges are precluded by the Sentencing Reform Act from
imposing a sentence in order to further the general rehabilitation of the defendant. 564
U.S. 319, 321, 332 (2011) However, the Court left a potential opening for courts to consider
the rehabilitative needs of the defendant when sentencing, and this has led to a circuit split.
See Marissa A. Booth, Note, The Road to Recovery: The Third Circuit Recognizes the Im-
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sentencing considerations, an offender’s ongoing conduct and life choices
clearly provide context for the adjudicator charged with determining the
appropriate sentence. This stands in stark contrast to the immigration
context where one moment in time casts an indelible mark against the
noncitizen.
B. TEMPORAL CONSIDERATIONS PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE
LARGER FRAMEWORK OF U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW

IN THE

Like other areas of law in the United States, temporality is directly tied
to the causes and effects of one’s legal immigration status. Time is used as
a metric for inclusion and exclusion and permeates many dimensions of
immigration law, but is notably absent as a consideration when it comes
to initiating deportation proceedings or imposing life-long punishments.148 The Immigration and Nationality Act relies upon various periods of time for particular reasons, including to gauge membership in the
community,149 the bona fides of a marriage150 or an investment opportunity,151 or a noncitizen’s good moral character.152 Particular lengths of
time are also used to trigger punishments, such as a three- or ten-year bar
to admissibility depending on whether the noncitizen was present in the
United States without authorization for six months to a year or over a
year.153 Particular visas that are aimed at training individuals and returning them to impart their knowledge and skills back in their home
country also rely on a set two-year period of return to the home
country.154
In these situations, Congress has determined that a particular period of
time is necessary to provide a broader window in which to assess a nonciportance of Rehabilitative Needs During Sentencing in United States v. Schonewolf, 64
VILL. L. REV. 569, 574 & nn.41–42 (2019).
148. See Juliet P. Stumpf, Doing Time: Crimmigration Law and the Perils of Haste, 58
UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1712–22, 1734–38 (2011).
149. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(1) (“No person, except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, shall be naturalized unless such applicant, (1) immediately preceding the date of
filing his application for naturalization has resided continuously, after being lawfully admitted for permanent residence, within the United States for at least five years . . . .”).
150. See id. § 1186a(h)(1) (defining “alien spouse” for purposes of the conditional permanent resident provision as “an alien who obtains the status of an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence . . . by virtue of a marriage which was entered into less than 24
months before the date the alien obtains such status”).
151. See id. § 1186b(b)(1) (“In the case of an alien entrepreneur with permanent resident status on a conditional basis under subsection (a), if the Attorney General determines, before the second anniversary of the alien’s obtaining the status of lawful admission
for permanent residence, that—(A) the investment in the commercial enterprise was intended solely as a means of evading the immigration laws of the United States, (B)(i) the
alien did not invest, or was not actively in the process of investing . . . then the Attorney
General . . . shall terminate the permanent resident status of the alien . . . .”).
152. See id. § 1427(a)(3).
153. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i). This section provides that a noncitizen who is unlawfully
present for more than six months but less than one year and who seeks admission within
three years of removal is inadmissible. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I). Likewise, a noncitizen
who is unlawfully present for more than one year and who seeks admission within ten
years of removal is inadmissible. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).
154. See id. § 1182(e).
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tizen or a relationship. For example, if a couple marry and the noncitizen
spouse seeks admission to the United States, the immigration status afforded will be tied directly to metrics based on the length of the marriage.155 If the couple has been married for less than two years at the time
that the noncitizen seeks admission, the noncitizen spouse will be limited
to conditional status for two years.156 The two-year time period is intended to ensure that the marriage endures and is not entered into solely
for immigration purposes.157 Rather than being frozen in time at the moment the couple weds, the immigration regime assesses the marriage over
the course of the two years after the wedding.158 If the marriage is still
intact after two years, the couple jointly petitions to remove the conditional status, leading to full, permanent residency.159 This joint petition is
supported by two years’ worth of proof that the marriage is indeed a bona
fide one (e.g., photos, joint bank accounts, a joint lease, letters from
friends and family describing the couple’s relationship, birth certificates
of children born into the marriage).160
Similarly, when a lawful permanent resident applies for naturalization
to become a U.S. citizen, they need to reside in the United States and
prove their good moral character over a period of five years, rather than
at any moment in time.161 As Professor Stumpf has observed, “[T]ime
functions to manage the risk that an intending noncitizen may not measure up to the criteria” to become a U.S. citizen.162 But requiring that
conduct over the span of five years also allows for rehabilitation and redemption, acknowledging that “people may change with the passage of
time.”163
The length of time in the United States is also used as an essential
metric in applications for discretionary relief from removal. For example,
a noncitizen who can show that they have resided in the United States for
at least ten years without being placed in removal proceedings can seek
discretionary relief to remain in the United States.164 Similarly, a lawful
155. See id. § 1186a(h).
156. See id. § 1186a(c)(3)(B); id. § 1186a(d)(2)(A).
157. See id. § 1227(a)(1)(G) (making a noncitizen deportable for having procured documentation or a visa by fraud if “the alien obtains any admission into the United States with
an immigrant visa or other documentation procured on the basis of a marriage entered into
less than 2 years subsequent to any admission of the alien and which, within 2 years subsequent to any admission of the alien in the United States, shall be judicially annulled or
terminated”).
158. See id. § 1186a(c)(1), (c)(3)(B), (d)(2)(A).
159. See id.
160. See id. § 1186a(d)(1); Removal of Conditional Status-Green Card Based on Marriage: Form I-751, LUBINER, SCHMIDT & PALUMBO, LLC, https://www.lslawyers.com/removal-conditional-status.html#:~:text=TO%20remove%20conditional%20status
%2C%20the,the%20green%20card%20was%20issued [https://perma.cc/PA5S-PBJM].
161. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a).
162. Stumpf, supra note 148, at 1713.
163. Id. at 1713–14.
164. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (setting forth cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents). In addition to requiring at least ten years of continuous presence in the
United States, this remedy also requires that the noncitizen’s removal would cause “excep-
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permanent resident can seek discretionary relief from removal if they
have been a lawful permanent resident for at least five years.165 Finally, a
discretionary waiver of certain inadmissibility grounds exists for past acts
that occurred more than fifteen years ago.166
These examples illustrate the way that the immigration regime recognizes and incorporates a time-based assessment in various circumstances,
rather than focusing in on one moment in time. This stands in stark contrast to the notion, expressed by the Senate subcommittee studying the
immigration law at the time that the statute of limitations was removed,
that the passage of time has no bearing on a noncitizen’s desirability.167
But when punishment for immigration status violations is at issue, Congress has relied on the length of time that a noncitizen remained without
permission in the United States to calculate the corresponding period of
exclusion from the nation. For example, if a noncitizen remains in the
United States without authorization for over six months to a year, the
noncitizen is barred from being readmitted for three years, even if they
have a lawful basis for readmission.168 If that unauthorized period in the
United States is more than one year, the bar to readmission is ten years,
rather than three.169 As Professor Juliet Stumpf has commented, time
serves as “both a measure and a method of punishment.”170 Rather than
use the length of time in the United States as a measure of membership,
the longer period of presence in the United States brings about a significantly lengthier period of exclusion.171
The question then is why time is used as a valuable measure in so many
aspects of immigration law but deemed irrelevant when most deportation
grounds are at issue172 (as well as the bars for frivolous asylum applications or the permanent waiver of due process when admitted under the
VWP, or the indelible stain of criminal charges, even when dismissed or
expunged). In the context of the immigration regime, time morphs depending upon the dimension of immigration law that is at issue.173 In the
context of holding noncitizens accountable for particular past acts, the
notion of time is suspended indefinitely.174 But in other areas of immigrational and extremely unusual hardship” to the applicant’s U.S.-citizen or LPR spouse, child
or parent. Id. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).
165. See id. § 1229b(a) (requiring that the individual have “resided in the United States
continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status” and not have been convicted of an aggravated felony).
166. See id. § 1182(h)(1)(A)(i) (giving the Attorney General the discretion to waive
particular crime-based inadmissibility grounds, including aggravated felonies in certain
circumstances).
167. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
168. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I).
169. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II).
170. Stumpf, supra note 148, at 1723.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 1712–23, 1734.
173. See id.
174. See id. at 1734–38.
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tion law, time is used as both a metric and means of punishment.175
Sometimes, the immigration law is even measured through a time machine whereby changes in law travel back in time and apply retroactively
to deport those whose bad acts didn’t even carry deportation consequences when committed.176
For example, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996.177 Some of its harshest
provisions include instituting three- and ten- year bars respectively to readmission for anyone who remained in the United States for six months
to a year or more than a year without permission and departed;178 removing judicial review of discretionary immigration decisions;179 expanding
the crime-based deportation grounds;180 and limiting due process and
statutory rights for anyone apprehended at, or near, the border.181 Moreover, Congress explicitly stated that many of the harshest provisions in
the new law would apply retroactively.182 For example, someone could
have committed a crime at a time when it carried no immigration consequences, but because Congress made the new deportation grounds retroactive, that person would now face deportation for the past act.183 One
way in which this played out was that many longtime, lawful permanent
residents who left the United States to visit family after IIRIRA found
themselves suddenly denied reentry and facing deportation when they
presented their green cards at airports upon return, a background check
having revealed a past crime that now carried deportation consequences.184 In the years since 1996, the Supreme Court has ruled in nu175. See id. at 1712–23.
176. See generally Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the
Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97 (1998).
177. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
178. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i).
179. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996,
§ 303, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e).
180. IIRIRA added four new types of crimes to the aggravated felony definition and
lowered certain threshold requirements. See id. § 321(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). For example, before IIRIRA, theft offenses and crimes of violence were aggravated felonies only if
the term of imprisonment was five years or more; IIRIRA reduced the term of imprisonment provision to a one-year threshold. See id. § 321(a)(3).
181. IIRIRA authorizes immigration enforcement officers, rather than judges, to order
the deportation of certain individuals who have been charged with inadmissibility under
section 212(a)(6)(c) or section 212(a)(7) of the Immigration and Nationality Act through a
process called “expedited removal.” See id. § 302(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i); 8 C.F.R.
§ 235.3(b) (2021).
182. See, e.g., id. § 321(b)–(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43); see also Immigr. & Naturalization
Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 318–19 & n.43 (2001), partially superseded by statute, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106(a), 119 Stat. 231, 310 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(5)), as recognized in Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1690 (2020).
183. See § 321(b)–(c).
184. See Austen Ishii, Note, There and Back, Now and Then: IIRIRA’s Retroactivity and
the Normalization of Judicial Review in Immigration Law, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 949,
950–51 (2014); US: 20 Years of Immigrant Abuses Under 1996 Laws, Arbitrary Detention,
Fast-Track Deportation, Family Separation, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 25, 2016, 8:00 AM) .
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merous cases implicating the constitutionality of various provisions of
IIRIRA.185 While the retroactivity of certain provisions has been prohibited by the Court, it has upheld the constitutionality of retroactive deportation grounds as long as Congress makes clear its intent to do so.186
Thus, not only does time stop when a noncitizen commits an act that
makes them deportable, the immigration statute can also travel back further in time to render noncitizens deportable today for acts committed
many years ago that were non-deportable at the time of commission.
C. THE CRIMINALIZATION

OF

IMMIGRANTS

Abolitionist and critical scholars are increasingly shedding light on the
ways in which criminal, legal, and other systems disproportionately target
people of color.187 We are called upon to reimagine the carceral state and
also the systems that interact with it, like the immigration system. In public discourse, immigrants are cast in extreme terms as either good or bad;
victims or villains. Most notably, former President Donald Trump referred to immigrants as “bad hombres”188 and “rapists and murderers”
who needed to be kept out of the country at all costs.189 Former President
Barack Obama also relied on the dichotomy between worthy and unworthy immigrants and focused on deporting “felons, not families.”190 However, as scholars like César Cuauhtémoc Garcı́a Hernández have noted,
felons also have families whose lives are disrupted when a family member
is deported.191
185. For a discussion of some of these cases, see Ishii, supra note 184, at 970–75.
186. See, e.g., St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 315–16 (“Despite the dangers inherent in retroactive
legislation, it is beyond dispute that, within constitutional limits, Congress has the power to
enact laws with retrospective effect. A statute may not be applied retroactively, however,
absent a clear indication from Congress that it intended such a result. ‘Requiring clear
intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of
retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits.’” (citation omitted) (first citing Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488
U.S. 204, 268 (1988); and then quoting id. at 272–273)).
187. See, e.g., NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE AND PUNISHMENT: RACIAL PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME AND SUPPORT FOR PUNITIVE POLICIES 5 (2014),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Race-and-Punishment.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7ZWJ-5C48].
188. Donald Trump: Deport ‘Bad Hombres’ - Video, GUARDIAN (Oct. 20, 2016, 4:46
PM),
189. Lola Méndez, Trump Referred to Immigrants as Rapists and Murderers, Again,
REMEZCLA (Oct. 16, 2020, 5:57 PM), https://remezcla.com/culture/trump-referred-immigrants-rapists-murderers-again [https://perma.cc/DM8H-PN9A]; Washington Post Staff,
Donald Trump Announces a Presidential Bid, WASH. POST (June 16, 2015), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/06/16/full-text-donald-trump-announces-a-presidential-bid/ [https://perma.cc/9AQZ-JR57] (“When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best . . . . They’re sending people that have lots of
problems . . . . They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists.”).
190. President Barack Obama, Remarks at Del Sol High School in Las Vegas, Nevada,
(Nov. 21, 2014), in 2014 PUB. PAPERS 1512, 1514 (“[W]e’ll keep focusing enforcement resources on actual threats to our security. But that means felons, not families.”).
191. See CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, MIGRATING TO PRISON:
AMERICA’S OBSESSION WITH LOCKING UP IMMIGRANTS 103–04 (2019).
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Immigration law casts all immigrants as villains, and then makes exceptions for certain discreet groups who are deemed more sympathetic because they are seen as innocent victims. For example, victims of human
trafficking or domestic violence have access to particular forms of relief
from deportation,192 whereas the majority of noncitizens facing removal
do not have any form of relief.
Although the criminal legal system purportedly includes rehabilitation
within its goals, it has become a carceral system seemingly aimed only at
punishment. The United States incarcerates more than any nation in the
world, with 5% of the world’s population and 25% of its prisoners.193 The
disparate impact of incarceration on the African-American community
has been widely studied. As reported by the Sentencing Project in 1995,
nearly one in three Black men in the United States “between the ages of
twenty and twenty-nine were under [the] control of the criminal justice
system, either in prison or jail, on probation, or on parole.”194 The exponential rise in incarceration of the African-American community is linked
to the War on Drugs.195
The criminalization of immigration law has similarly led to a dramatic
rise in detaining immigrants, particularly immigrants of color.196 The
United States now detains approximately 500,000 immigrants per year
with over 200 detention centers throughout the nation.197 Immigrants exist at the intersection of an overly criminalized immigration regime within
this broader carceral state project.
192. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106386, div. A, § 107(c), (e), (f), 114 Stat. 1466, 1474–80 (codified in scattered sections of 8 and
22 U.S.C.); Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-386, div. B, §§ 1512–13, 114
Stat. 1491, 1533–37 (codified in scattered sections of 8 and 42 U.S.C.). The Trafficking
Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000 was enacted to strengthen the ability of law enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute serious crimes and human trafficking. See
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act § 102(a), 114 Stat. at 1466 (codified at
22 U.S.C. § 7101(a)). In order to do so, the legislation allows for victim protection from
deportation in the form of T and U visas. See id. § 107(e)(4), 114 Stat. at 1479 (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)); Violence Against Women Act § 1513(b), 114 Stat. at 1534–35
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)).
193. Ben Gifford, Prison Crime and the Economics of Incarceration, 71 STAN. L. REV.
71, 74 (2019).
194. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African
American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1274 (2004) (citing THE SENT’G PROJECT,
YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER 1
(1995)).
195. Id. at 1275. The War on Drugs has resulted in a system in which almost half of the
people in federal prison are incarcerated for a drug offense—two-thirds of whom are people of color. DRUG POL’Y ALL., THE DRUG WAR, MASS INCARCERATION AND RACE 2
(2015), https://drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/drug-war-mass-incarceration-andrace_01_18_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/DB3J-RRBC]; MARC MAUER, THE SENT’G PROJECT,
THE CHANGING RACIAL DYNAMICS OF THE WAR ON DRUGS 1 (2009), https://
www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/The-Changing-Racial-Dynamicsof-the-War-on-Drugs.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DKD-746Y].
196. See EWING, MARTÍNEZ & RUMBAUT, supra note 54, at 2–4, 13; JULIANA MORGANTROSTLE & KEXIN ZHENG, THE STATE OF BLACK IMMIGRANTS 16–18, 24–26 (2022),
https://stateofblackimmigrants.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/sobi-fullreport-jan22.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F9RN-N8UV].
197. Immigration Detention 101, supra note 56.
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As criminology scholars have explained, “criminal law and criminal justice institutions increasingly represent only the most visible tentacles of
penal power,” with immigration enforcement and detention constituting
one of the “more submerged, serpentine forms of punishment that
work[s] in legally hybrid and institutionally variegated ways.”198 This
“shadow carceral state” includes “punishment without violation of criminal law and detention without criminal due process,” “ensnar[ing] vulnerable and racially marginalized individuals through mechanisms that, in
many ways, simply presume their guilt.”199
The criminalization of immigrants adversely impacts them in different
ways. While crossing the border without authorization had technically
been a criminal act, immigrants did not face criminal prosecutions until
DHS changed its focus from voluntary repatriations of those apprehended at the border to criminal prosecutions, beginning in 2005.200 At
that point, prosecutors began routinely charging immigrants who were
apprehended crossing the border without authorization with federal criminal charges prior to initiating deportation proceedings.201 This criminalization of immigration violations, and immigrants, is not limited to the
southern border. Federal prosecutors also use criminal grounds to convict
and detain immigrants who are apprehended during worksite raids and
have used false Social Security numbers.202 Today, the vast majority of
federal criminal prosecutions in the United States are for immigration
198. Katherine Beckett & Naomi Murakawa, Mapping the Shadow Carceral State: Toward an Institutionally Capacious Approach to Punishment, 16 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 221, 222 (2012).
199. Id. at 224.
200. See AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 3; Does Administration Amnesty
Harm Our Efforts to Gain and Maintain Operational Control of the Border?: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Border and Mar. Sec. of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th
Cong. 18–19 (2011) (statement of Michael J. Fisher, Chief of U.S. Border Patrol).
201. See Beckett & Murakawa, supra note 198, at 233. “8 U.S.C. § 1325 makes it a
crime to unlawfully enter the United States . . . . A first offense is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine, up to six months in prison, or both.” AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, supra note 55, at
2. “8 U.S.C. § 1326 makes it a crime to unlawfully reenter, attempt to unlawfully reenter,
or to be found in the United States after having been deported, ordered removed, or denied admission. This crime is punishable as a felony with a maximum sentence of two years
in prison.” Id. However, if the individual “was previously removed after having been convicted of certain crimes,” the sentence is enhanced to “up to 10 years for a single felony
conviction (other than an aggravated felony conviction) or three misdemeanor convictions
involving drugs or crimes against a person, and up to 20 years for an aggravated felony
conviction.” Id.
202. See Beckett & Murakawa, supra note 198, at 233. One of the most high-profile
examples of this practice involved a raid by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
at a meatpacking plant in Postville, Iowa. Id. During that raid, ICE apprehended and detained approximately 400 workers in a makeshift detention facility at a cattle fairground.
Id. Rather than just initiating deportation proceedings against the undocumented workers,
ICE charged them all with the crimes of knowingly using false security numbers and aggravated identity theft. Id. ICE then pressured the workers to plead guilty to the lesser criminal charge by threatening that a not guilty plea would result in more time in jail awaiting a
trial, with deportation still inevitable afterwards. Id. As Beckett and Murakawa point out,
“[B]y bringing criminal charges to bear on what would otherwise be an administrative matter, authorities weakened the capacity of alleged immigration law violators to contest their
criminal as well as their administrative conviction.” Id.
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violations.203 While criminalization of vulnerable populations has existed
for many years, the wide-scale use of it in the administrative immigration
context is unique.
In the context of the criminal justice regime, there is a growing movement aimed at limiting the carceral state and addressing the inequalities
inherent in the current system. For example, in 2021, Illinois became the
first state to eliminate cash bail payments for jail release.204 A number of
states have similarly passed legislation aimed at sentencing reform.205
Specifically with regards to marijuana-based convictions, states have acted to allow for resentencing in certain circumstances.206
Perhaps nowhere have the carceral reform efforts been more dramatic
than in the context of juvenile offenders. For example, recent legislative
reforms include raising the minimal age for adult prosecutions to eighteen years of age, incorporating alternatives to incarceration, and improving the conditions of confinement.207 But while there is movement to end
juvenile incarceration and cash bond requirements and to reform the
criminal incarceration system, there has been less progress made in limiting detention in the immigration context. In a positive move, the Biden
Administration issued guidelines with articulated priorities for who
203. AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 2. Violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1325 and
§ 1326 (together) have become “the most prosecuted federal offenses.” Id. As of December 2018, 65% of all criminal prosecutions in federal court were for these two immigration
entry grounds. Id.
204. Maria Cramer, Illinois Becomes First State to Eliminate Cash Bail, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/23/us/illinois-cash-bail-pritzker.html
[https://perma.cc/7BWE-342L]; H.B. 3653, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2021).
205. For example, California removed the one-year enhancement for prior felonies. See
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(b) (West 2021). Delaware removed geographic-based sentencing enhancements. See S.B. 47, 150th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2019). In the District
of Columbia, individuals that committed certain crimes before twenty-five years of age and
who served fifteen years of their sentence may now petition for sentencing modification.
D.C. CODE § 24–403.03(a)–(b) (West 2022).
206. For example, in California, persons who are currently serving a sentence for a
conviction of marijuana offense (for an act now legalized or with a lesser sentence) may
petition for resentencing or dismissal. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11361.8(a) (West
2022). If the person has already completed their sentence, they can now petition for record
sealing. Id. § 11361.8(c).
207. Pursuant to legislative reform in New York: sixteen- and seventeen-year olds who
commit nonviolent crimes receive intervention- and evidence-based treatment; a new “adolescent offender” category exists for sixteen- and seventeen-year olds accused of committing a felony, who will have their cases heard in youth criminal court; and children and
adolescents are no longer permitted in adult facilities or jails. Off. for Just. Initiatives, Raise
the Age, NYCOURTS.GOV, https://ww2.nycourts.gov/ip/oji/raisetheage.shtml#:~:text=the
%20law%20will%20take%20effeef,the%20Raise%20the%20Age%20legislation [https://
perma.cc/JV62-XV82]. In Georgia, an act to modernize juvenile justice proceedings resulted in several juvenile justice reforms, including limiting offenses eligible for detention,
implementing early intervention, and providing alternatives to incarceration. See H.B. 242,
2013–2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2014). Virginia entirely removed life without
parole sentences for crimes committed before the age of eighteen. See H.B. 35, 2020 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020). Arkansas, Louisiana, and North Dakota limit the use of
youth detention for low-risk youth by using screening tools. See S.B. 152, 92d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2019); H.B. 158, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2019); H.B. 1520, 66th
Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2019).
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should be subject to detention.208 A few states have also passed legislation prohibiting state-run prisons from contracting with ICE to detain
noncitizens facing removal.209 Unfortunately, however, ICE continues to
detain the majority of immigrants facing removal, and prison facilities
ending contracts in one region just means that the immigrants are moved
to facilities further from their families and lawyers.210 Immigration detention operates at a federal level, so until there is a change in legislation or
policy at that level, the detention regime will continue to grow. Imposing
a statute of limitations on deportation and evaluating past acts within the
context of the noncitizen’s contributions would be a starting point towards reform.
V. MOVING FORWARD: THE CASE FOR A STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS FOR DEPORTATION
A. DEPORTATION

AS A

PUNITIVE SANCTION WITHIN
REGIME

A

CIVIL LAW

In analyzing the level of constitutional protections that must be afforded to noncitizens in removal proceedings, the Supreme Court has
consistently characterized deportation proceedings as civil in nature,
rather than criminal.211 This civil/criminal distinction has significant
ramifications in the context of constitutional law. The Court’s holding
that deportation is not a punishment in the criminal justice sense means
that there are fewer constitutional protections.212 For example, noncitizens in removal proceedings are not entitled to appointed counsel at no
expense if they cannot afford to hire a lawyer.213 Similarly, deportation
grounds can be changed retroactively as the Ex Post Facto Clause does
not apply.214 Noncitizens also cannot prevail in alleging that they are be208. See Memorandum from Tae D. Johnson, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs
Enf’t, to All ICE Employees, Interim Guidance: Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Priorities 4–5 (Feb. 18, 2021), .
209. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-8:16 (West 2021) (prohibiting state and local entities and private correctional facilities from entering into agreements with federal immigration authorities to detain noncitizens).
210. See Emily Ryo & Ian Peacock, Hundreds of County Jails Detained Immigrants for
ICE, THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 11, 2020, 8:53 AM), https://theconversation.com/hundredsof-county-jails-detained-immigrants-for-ice-128601 [https://perma.cc/TR34-DH54].
211. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (“A
deportation proceeding is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this
country . . . .”); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) (“Deportation, however severe its consequences, has been consistently classified as a civil rather than a criminal procedure.”); Fong v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 728–29 (1893) (characterizing
deportation proceedings as civil in nature).
212. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038 (“Consistent with the civil nature of the
proceeding, various protections that apply in the context of a criminal trial do not apply in
a deportation hearing.”).
213. See 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (“In any removal proceedings before an immigration judge
and in any appeal proceedings before the Attorney General from any such removal proceedings, the person concerned shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense
to the Government) by such counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall
choose.” (emphasis added)).
214. See Morawetz, supra note 176, at 97–98.
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ing punished twice when facing deportation after completing a criminal
sentence for a conviction because the Double Jeopardy Clause is inapplicable in civil proceedings.215
But for purposes of analyzing whether a statute of limitations should
apply to deportation, the inquiry must be different. The question should
not be whether the proceedings are civil or criminal in nature but rather
whether deportation is a penalty, civil or otherwise. This alternate inquiry
is essential because 28 U.S.C. § 2462 imposes a five-year statute of limitations on governmental actions involving civil penalties or forfeitures.216
There are many areas of civil law that contain punitive sanctions if the
law is violated. For example, state laws authorize liquidated damages and
criminal sanctions for an employer who fails to comply with wage and
hour laws.217 Similarly, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act authorizes punitive damages when an employer intentionally discriminates based on a
protected ground.218 By analogy, deportation should be viewed as a punitive sanction for violating the civil immigration regulatory scheme. As
such, the general five-year statute of limitations set forth at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2462 should apply.
The Supreme Court has addressed the question of whether a sanction
should be considered a penalty for purposes of this five-year statute of
limitations in the context of a Securities and Exchange Commission action for disgorgement.219 In reversing the appellate court and holding
that disgorgement constituted a penalty subject to the five-year statute of
limitations, the Court explained,
[W]hether a sanction represents a penalty turns in part on “whether
the wrong sought to be redressed is a wrong to the public, or a wrong
to the individual.” . . . [A] pecuniary sanction operates as a penalty
only if it is sought “for the purpose of punishment, and to deter
others from offending in like manner”—as opposed to compensating
215. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (prohibiting prosecution for substantially same crime);
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038 (stating that deportation is purely civil and not punitive
in nature); United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 287–90, 289 n.3 (1996) (recognizing the
presumption that defendants in civil actions are not subject to Double Jeopardy Clause).
216. 28 U.S.C. § 2462.
217. For example, under New Jersey’s Wage Theft Act, employees who prevail in proving their employer owes them wages or engaged in retaliation can recover the wages owed
plus liquidated damages in an additional amount equal to up to 200% of the unpaid wages,
in addition to reasonable costs and the employee’s attorneys’ fees. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:114:10 (West 2021). The statute also provides for criminal penalties in certain circumstances.
Id. § 34:11-58.6.
218. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (“In an action brought
by a complaining party under section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against a
respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) prohibited under section 703, 704, or
717 of the Act, and provided that the complaining party cannot recover under section 1981
of this title, the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as
allowed in subsection (b), in addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent.”).
219. See Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1639, 1642 (2017).
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a victim for his loss.220
Moreover, “‘sanctions frequently serve more than one purpose.’ ‘A civil
sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but
rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent
purposes, is punishment.’”221
Deportation proceedings meet all of the criteria set forth in Kokesh v.
SEC to be considered a penalty subject to the five-year statute of limitations. First, deportation proceedings are brought on behalf of the United
States for a bad act deemed to have been perpetrated against the nation.222 Deportation proceedings do not seek to compensate any particular individual who has been harmed.223 Deportation is widely seen to
serve a deterrent purpose, analogous to the SEC’s motive in pursuing
disgorgement as a penalty.224 Most significantly, deportation is clearly
meant as a punishment, even if immigration proceedings overall are
viewed as civil, rather than criminal, proceedings.225
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court explicitly described deportation as a “particularly severe ‘penalty.’”226 As Justice Stevens noted in
authoring the majority opinion, “deportation is an integral part—indeed,
sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed
on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”227
Noncitizens have also had some success relying on the past administration’s racist tweets and statements to show a punitive intent to discriminate. For example, in Ramos v. Nielsen, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California enjoined DHS from implementing or enforcing the determinations to terminate Temporary Protected Status
(TPS) for Sudan, Nicaragua, Haiti, and El Salvador while the case continued its way through the legal system.228 This preliminary injunction was
based on the showing that the former administration was motivated by
race-based animus in terminating the TPS program for nationals of these
countries.229 But regardless of whether a punitive intent is explicitly
stated, Justices have rightly characterized deportation as punishment
220. Id. at 1642 (citations omitted) (quoting Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 668
(1892)).
221. Id. at 1645 (citation omitted) (quoting Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610,
621).
222. Cf. id. at 1643.
223. Cf. id. at 1644.
224. Cf. id. at 1643.
225. Cf. id.
226. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (quoting Fong v. United States, 149
U.S. 698, 740 (1893)).
227. Id. at 364 (footnote omitted).
228. Ramos v. Nielsen, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1108 (N.D. Cal. 2018), vacated sub nom.,
Ramos v. Wolf, 975 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Ramos v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d
1083, 1099–1100, 1131–32 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss
plaintiff’s equal protection claim based on showing of animus).
229. Ramos v. Nielsen, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 1080–81, 1100–01.
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since the late 1800s.230
1. Denaturalization Proceedings
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on whether the five-year
statute of limitations for civil penalties or forfeitures applies to deportation proceedings, district and circuit courts have consistently held that it
is inapplicable in the context of denaturalization proceedings. In United
States v. Donkor, a naturalized U.S. citizen argued that the government
should be barred by the five-year statute of limitations from commencing
denaturalization proceedings against him.231 In that case, the government
initiated denaturalization proceedings because it alleged that Donkor had
lied to obtain his citizenship; thus, the denaturalization was aimed at removing a benefit that never should have been awarded.232 The court
agreed with the government that denaturalization was not a punitive remedy but rather an attempt to cure a defect in the original citizenship
process.233
Similarly, in United States v. Multani, the District Court for the Western
District of Washington joined with multiple courts who have held that
denaturalization is not a civil forfeiture or penalty.234 As the court explained, “[T]he purpose of the statute is not punitive, but, instead, merely
to ‘remedy a past fraud by taking back a benefit to which an alien is not
entitled.’ Further, it does not ‘impos[e] a fine, penalty, or sentence of
imprisonment—only the revocation of citizenship.’”235 The court further
noted,
[It] ha[d] been unable to locate, a single case applying a state Statute
of Limitations to a denaturalization action. Instead, every court that
ha[d] addressed the applicability of a Statute of Limitations, albeit
most often in the 28 U.S.C. § 2462 context, ha[d] held that Congress’s lack of a Statute of Limitations in 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) was intended to provide the United States leeway to bring such actions
unburdened by a timeliness limitation.236
In the denaturalization context, the courts’ reasoning focuses on the
government not acting to punish, but rather to cure a defect in a benefit
that would not have been granted absent willful fraud on the part of the
230. See, e.g., Fong, 149 U.S. at 740 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (“Deportation is punishment. It involves—First an arrest, a deprival of liberty; and, second, a removal from home,
from family, from business, from property.”). In the same case, Justice Field described
deportation as a “punishment . . . beyond all reason in its severity . . . . It is cruel and
unusual.” Id. at 759 (Field, J., dissenting).
231. United States v. Donkor, 507 F. Supp. 3d 423, 426 (E.D.N.Y. 2020).
232. Id. at 425–26.
233. Id. at 429–30 (“[D]enaturalization is not punitive because its purpose is not to
punish the individual but to restore the status quo and regulate the process by which the
government extends citizenship.”).
234. See United States v. Multani, No. 2:19-cv-01789-BJR, 2021 WL 633638, at *1
(W.D. Wash. Feb. 18, 2021).
235. Id. at *5 (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Phattey, 943 F.3d
1277, 1279, 1281 (9th Cir. 2019)).
236. Id. at *3.
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applicant. Arguably, the same reasoning could be applied to a noncitizen
who used a fraudulent document to enter the country. But noncitizens
face deportation after extended periods in the United States for a host of
reasons. The vast majority of deportation grounds have nothing to do
with remedial measures; rather, they are punishments for post-entry conduct.237 To give just one example, the multiple criminal deportation
grounds aim to remove a noncitizen for engaging in criminal conduct in
the United States.238 These post-entry, conduct-based deportation
grounds are not intended to restore the status quo. Rather, they are sanctions intended to punish a wrongdoer and fit squarely within the civil
enforcement statute of limitations.
2. Deportation Proceedings
Notwithstanding the reality that the government is seeking to punish
an individual and foster deterrence of similar conduct for an alleged harm
against the nation as a whole, the circuit courts consistently hold that the
civil enforcement statute of limitations does not apply in deportation proceedings. For example, in Restrepo v. Attorney General of United States, a
long-time, lawful permanent resident facing removal as an aggravated
felon argued that the government was barred from initiating removal proceedings because approximately ten years had passed since his conviction.239 He relied on 28 U.S.C. § 2462, which provides that proceedings
for the enforcement of “‘any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture’ must be
commenced no later than five years from the date when the claim accrued, except as otherwise provided by law.”240 Restrepo argued that the
removal proceedings were akin to a penalty or forfeiture action and
therefore limited to the five-year period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2462.241
To support his assertion that deportation is a forfeiture, Restrepo relied
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan.242 In that
case, the majority wrote, “[Removal] is the forfeiture for misconduct of a
residence in this country. Such a forfeiture is a penalty.”243 However, in
affirming the BIA’s determination, the Third Circuit relied upon Supreme Court and other Third Circuit jurisprudence holding that deportation is not punishment and held that there was no time limit in which the
government had to take action.244 The Third Circuit also relied upon 8
237. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (setting forth the myriad of deportability grounds).
238. See id. § 1227(a)(2).
239. Restrepo v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 617 F.3d 787, 789 (3d Cir. 2010).
240. Id. at 801 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2462).
241. Id.
242. Id. (citing Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)).
243. Id. (alteration in original) (citing Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 10).
244. Id. at 800–02, 802 n.23 (first quoting Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. LopezMendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (“A deportation proceeding is . . . not [intended] to
punish an unlawful entry[.]” (alterations in original)); then quoting Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S.
32, 39 (1924) (“It is well settled that deportation, while it may be burdensome and severe
for the alien, is not a punishment.”); and then quoting Bufalino v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 473 F.2d 728, 739 (3d Cir. 1973) (Adams, C.J., concurring) (noting that “deportation statutes are not penal in nature”)).
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U.S.C. § 1229(d) to support its holding that the government is not bound
by a statute of limitations when initiating removal proceedings.245
While the court held that the statute could not be interpreted to require a time limitation for deportation proceedings, it pointed out the
incongruity in the lack of a statute of limitations in this case.246 However,
the court made it clear that this was an issue for the legislature to address.247 The court noted that no reasonable explanation was offered for
the government’s failure to initiate proceedings against Restrepo “until
ten years after his conviction, and eight years after the definition of ‘aggravated felony’ was amended to include sexual abuse of a minor.”248 It
concluded,
We find this enforcement history troubling, and it begs the question
which we posed to the Attorney General at oral argument, in essence: is it not appropriate to impose some statute of limitations governing the period within which the [U.S. Department of Immigration
and Custom Enforcement] may prosecute the removal of aliens convicted of aggravated felonies?249
In United States ex rel. Poppovich v. Karnuth, the government began
deportation proceedings against a noncitizen based on illegal reentry, and
the court noted that the action was not time-barred.250 Without further
reasoning, the district court held that there was no statute of limitations
on deportation because it did not exist in the 1924 Immigration Act.251
3. Recission of Adjustment of Status
Another issue before the courts has been whether the five-year statute
of limitations for recission of adjustment of status applies to deportation
proceedings. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a), the government must act
within five years to rescind an improperly granted adjustment of status.252
While there has been some disagreement amongst the circuits as to
245. Id. at 801. In the context of encouraging expeditious commencement of removal
proceedings, Congress specified that “[n]othing in this subsection shall be construed to
create any substantive or procedural right or benefit that is legally enforceable by any
party against the United States or its agencies or officers or any other person.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229(d)(2).
246. Restrepo, 617 F.3d at 801 (noting the court’s “discomfiture with the prolonged delay in initiation of removal proceedings”).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. United States ex rel. Poppovich v. Karnuth, 25 F. Supp. 883, 883–84 (W.D.N.Y.
1938).
251. Id. at 884.
252. 8 U.S.C. § 1256(a) (“If, at any time within five years after the status of a person
has been otherwise adjusted under the provisions of section 1255 or 1259 of this title or any
other provision of law to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, it shall
appear to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the person was not in fact eligible
for such adjustment of status, the Attorney General shall rescind the action taken granting
an adjustment of status to such person and cancelling removal in the case of such person if
that occurred and the person shall thereupon be subject to all provisions of this chapter to
the same extent as if the adjustment of status had not been made.”).
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whether the limitations period for recission of adjustment of status also
limits deportation proceedings that flow from the same underlying fraud,
the majority of circuits have held that the limitation period is solely applicable to recission of adjustment of status.253 In Biggs v. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, the noncitizen argued that the government was
barred from removing him because of the five-year limitation on rescission of status.254 The Ninth Circuit rejected this claim, again asserting
that there is no statute of limitations for deportation.255 The Eight Circuit
followed suit in Kim v Holder.256 However, the Third Circuit took a different approach in Garcia v. Attorney General of the United States.257 In
that case, the noncitizen had procured lawful permanent resident status
through a willful misrepresentation as to the identity of her mother.258
More than five years passed and then Garcia applied for naturalization.259 At that point, the government became aware of the underlying
fraud and began deportation proceedings against her.260 The Third Circuit reversed the BIA’s determination and held that the same five-year
bar that precluded the government from moving to rescind Garcia’s lawful permanent residence must also bar the government from initiating deportation proceedings.261 The Third Circuit relied on its prior ruling in
Bamidele v. Immigration and Naturalization Service that, “the running of
the limitation period bars the rescission of Bamidele’s permanent resident status and, in the absence of the commission of any other offense,
thereby bars initiation of deportation proceedings in this case.”262 However, in Malik v. Attorney General of the United States, the Third Circuit
clarified its view that the removal proceedings must be linked to recission
for adjustment of status based on fraud in order for the statute of limitations to apply to both proceedings.263
Perhaps the incongruity between the significance of statutes of limitation in the criminal context and the complete lack of such statutes of limitation in the immigration context can best be seen in situations where the
253. See Biggs v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 55 F.3d 1398, 1401 (9th Cir. 1995);
Kim v. Holder, 560 F.3d 833, 837–38 (8th Cir. 2009); Asika v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 264,
269–271 (4th Cir. 2004).
254. Biggs, 55 F.3d at 1401.
255. Id.
256. See Kim, 560 F.3d at 837–38. The Fourth Circuit has similarly held that the statute
of limitations for recission of adjustment of status is inapplicable to deportation proceedings. See Asika, 362 F.3d at 271.
257. Garcia v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 553 F.3d 724 (3d Cir. 2009).
258. Id. at 726.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 728–29.
262. Id. at 726 (quoting Bamidele v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 99 F.3d 557, 563
(3d Cir. 1996)).
263. Malik v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 659 F.3d 253, 257 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The import of
Garcia and Bamidele is that the time bar in § 1256(a) applies to both rescission and removal proceedings initiated based on a fraudulent adjustment of status.”).
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same act gives rise to both deportation and criminal prosecution.264 However, Congress has specified that prosecution for any of these crimes must
be brought within a set period of time. For example, if the government
wants to prosecute someone for misusing evidence of citizenship or naturalization or if someone uses a false statement in applying for or using a
passport, or procuring citizenship unlawfully, it must do so within ten
years.265 In contrast, the government can seek to deport a noncitizen for
those same acts at any time.
Of course, Congress is free to establish separate statutes of limitations
and has arguably chosen to except deportation from the general statute of
limitations that otherwise applies to civil enforcement. But seeing how
neatly deportation fits within the existing five-year statute of limitations
is helpful for thinking about why deportation is treated so differently than
other civil enforcement penalties. By refusing to acknowledge the punitive nature of deportation, both the judicial and legislative branches of
government have carved out and perpetuated this exceptional treatment
for immigrants facing deportation.
B. LACHES-BASED DEFENSES ARE EXTREMELY LIMITED
IMMIGRATION LAW

IN

Perhaps it could be argued that there are other avenues available for
exercising discretion and compassion to ameliorate the harshness and inequities of an unforgiving law. The immigration law used to provide for
suspension of deportation for undocumented immigrants facing deportation.266 In order to qualify for this discretionary relief, an immigrant
needed to have seven years of continuous presence in the United States
and show that their deportation would cause extreme hardship to the
alien or to a U.S. citizen or LPR immediate family member.267 But Congress repealed this provision in 1996 and replaced it with a form of relief
that is much more stringent.268 Under the new cancellation of removal
provision, the immigrant must show that they have been in the United
States continuously for at least ten years before the start of removal proceedings.269 The standard for hardship was raised from “extreme” to “exceptional and extremely unusual.”270 Finally, whereas in the prior
suspension of deportation provision the hardship could be to the immi264. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (for examples of criminal offenses that give rise to both
prosecution and deportation).
265. See 18 U.S.C. § 3291 (“No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for violation of any provision of sections 1423 to 1428, inclusive, of chapter 69 and sections 1541 to
1544, inclusive, of chapter 75 of title 18 of the United States Code, or for conspiracy to
violate any of such sections, unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted
within ten years after the commission of the offense.”); id. §§ 1423–1426, 1542–1544.
266. See 8 C.F.R. § 240.65(a)–(b) (2021).
267. Id. § 240.65(b).
268. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of
1996 § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b.
269. Id. § 1229b(b)(1)(A).
270. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 240.65(b)(3) (“extreme hardship”), with 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(1)(D) (“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”).
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grant themself, now it must be to a qualifying citizen or LPR family
member.271
For exceptionally deserving cases, there is the possibility of seeking a
private bill to avoid deportation.272 This used to be quite common. In
fact, “From the 77th session of Congress in 1942 until the 107th session in
2003, 60,601 immigration related private bills were introduced.”273 But
this is no longer the case. Today, private immigration bills are rarely
passed.274 Moreover, while it had been common practice for ICE to grant
a stay of removal to last throughout the lengthy legislative process, it
changed its policy so it is now nearly impossible to obtain a stay of removal that would last while a bill makes its way through Congress.275
Because so many of the prior avenues for exercising discretion have
been removed, it is more important to reinstitute a statute of limitations.
It would also be consistent with prioritizing government resources as it
doesn’t make sense to spend resources deporting immigrants that have
already been in the United States for a long period of time.

271. Compare 8 C.F.R. § 240.65(b)(3) (“The alien’s deportation would, in the opinion
of the Attorney General, result in extreme hardship to the alien or to the alien’s spouse,
parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence.”), with 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (requiring that the noncitizen “establish[ ] that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the
alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence”).
272. See Anna Marie Gallagher, Remedies of Last Resort: Private Bills and Pardons, 0602 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 1 (2006).
273. Id.
274. The Legal and Practical Effects of Private Immigration Legislation and Recent Policy Changes, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS PROJECT ON GOV’T SECRECY (June 6, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/REG8-878W] (noting that, only a few of the nearly 400 private immigration bills proposed in Congress within the last ten years have been passed).
275. See Letter from Thomas D. Homan, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, to
Sen. Charles E. Grassley, Chairman of Comm. on the Judiciary (May 5, 2017), https://
www.durbin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ICE%20Response%20to%20Letter%20on%20
Private%20Immigration%20Relief%20Bills.pdf [https://perma.cc/4AU9-ZAVJ]. ICE’s
new policy sets forth that:
1. ICE will consider and issue a stay of removal only if the Chair of the full
Committee or Subcommittee expressly makes a written request that ICE stay
the beneficiary’s removal independent of any request for an investigative
report. . . .
2. ICE will not grant a beneficiary more than one stay of removal through
the private immigration bill process. As such, ICE will not [consider] subsequent requests for a stay of removal from the Chair of the Committee or
Subcommittee . . . .
3. The duration of a stay of removal will be limited to 6 months. However,
the ICE Director, at his or her discretion, can provide a 1-time 90-day extension . . . if specifically requested by the Chair of the Committee or Subcommittee and, if necessary, to accommodate extenuating circumstances.
4. ICE will take appropriate action, including the removal of the alien-beneficiary, in cases where ICE receives derogatory information about an alienbeneficiary after issuing a stay of removal.
Id.
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A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF TIME PASSES, THE PUNISHMENT
DEPORTATION IS NOT PROPORTIONAL TO MOST
GROUNDS FOR DEPORTATION

After a certain length of time, the punishment of deportation is completely disproportional to the violation of unlawful entry.276 While there
are a myriad of deportation grounds, length of time in the United States
is one yard stick by which proportionality can be measured. The longer a
person lives in the United States, the more disproportional it is to deport
them for any one act. The concept of proportionality animates many areas of law. To provide just a few examples, proportionality is used as a
guiding principle of constitutional law and “requires that government intrusions on freedoms be justified, that greater intrusions have stronger
justifications, and that punishments reflect the relative severity of the offense.”277 In administrative law, the principle of proportionality means
that “when the government acts, the means it chooses should be welladapted to achieve the ends it is pursuing.”278 Proportionality is also a
core principle in international law, which specifies that the legality of an
action depends on the balance between the objective and the means and
methods used as well as the consequences of the action.279 In immigration
law, for purposes of asylum adjudication, proportionality is used to determine whether a foreign country’s punishment for a crime is a legitimate
prosecution or a pretextual persecutory act.280 If the punishment is disproportional to the criminal act, it is deemed to be persecution and would
not subject the applicant to the bar to asylum protection for those with
criminal records.281
The argument that deportation after a certain length of time is disproportional to the immigration violation is perhaps strongest when the violation is unlawful entry. As Joseph Carens has noted,
As irregular migrants become more and more settled, their membership in society grows in moral importance, and the fact that they settled without authorization becomes correspondingly less relevant. At
some point a threshold is crossed, and they acquire a moral claim to
have their actual social membership legally recognized.282
276. See, e.g., JOSEPH H. CARENS, IMMIGRANTS AND THE RIGHT TO STAY 12 (2010).
277. Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J.
3094, 3094, 3104–10 (2015).
278. JUD MATHEWS, PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 405, 405 (Susan Rose-Ackerman, Peter L. Lindseth &
Blake Emerson eds., 2d ed. 2017).
279. See Judith Gail Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law, 87 AM. J.
INT’L L. 391, 391, 407 (1993).
280. See Asylum Manual, IMMIGR. EQUAL., https://immigrationequality.org/asylum/asylum-manual/asylum-law-basics-2/asylum-law-basics-elements-of-asylum-law [https://
perma.cc/75NR-KAFG].
281. See id.
282. CARENS, supra note 276, at 18. Carens places great weight on length of time in the
country, noting that “[n]othing in my argument denies a government’s moral and legal
right to prevent entry in the first place and to deport those who settle without authoriza-
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In addition to deportation for an immigration violation or minor crime
being disproportional after many years in the United States, it is also immoral. In the criminal justice context, “[m]ost states recognize that the
passage of time matters morally, at least for less-serious criminal violations.”283 “If a person has not been arrested and charged within a specified period (often three to five years), legal authorities” are barred from
taking action.284 States have enacted these limitations because:
[I]t is not right to make people live indefinitely with a threat of serious legal consequences hanging over their heads for some long-past
action, except for the most serious sorts of offenses. Keeping the
threat in place for a long period serves no useful deterrent function
and causes great harm to the individual—more than is warranted by
the original offense. If we are prepared to let time erode the state’s
power to pursue actual crimes, it makes even more sense to let time
erode the power of the state to pursue immigration violations, which
are not normally treated as crimes and should not be viewed as
crimes.285
D. LESSONS

FROM

AUSTRALIA: A CAUTIONARY TALE

Australia is arguably the only large Western refugee-receiving nation
with harsher immigration laws than the United States.286 However, even
Australia has a ten-year statute of limitations on deportation of permanent residents with criminal convictions.287 Nevertheless, Australia has
increasingly found ways to work around this time limitation. For example,
it amended the Immigration Act in 1992 to include a visa cancellation
ground.288 This visa cancellation ground was intended to allow a discretionary ability to refuse entry to an immigrant who was deemed to be
undesirable (rather than a vehicle for removing residents in Australia).289
However, the provision also allows for cancellation of a previously issued
visa if an immigrant were deemed to be of poor moral character.290 “Unlike the criminal deportation power, there [is] no exemption for longterm permanent residents.”291 It “was not intended to supplant or circumvent the criminal deportation power.”292 But over time, with the intion, so long as these expulsions take place at a relatively early stage of residence.” Id. at
27.
283. Joseph H. Carens, The Case for Amnesty, BOS. REV. (June 27, 2012), ; see also
DOYLE, supra note 27, at 25–30.
284. Carens, supra note 283; see also DOYLE, supra note 27, at 25–30.
285. Carens, supra note 283.
286. See Claire Loughan, Australia’s Harsh Immigration Policy, THE DIPLOMAT (Sept.
1, 2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/australias-harsh-immigration-policy [https://
perma.cc/7KG4-U3Z5].
287. See Khanh Hoang & Sudrishti Reich, Managing Crime Through Migration Law in
Australia and the United States: A Comparative Analysis, 5 COMPAR. MIGRATION STUD. 12
(2017).
288. Id.
289. See id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
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creasing merger of immigration and criminal law, “the executive made a
shift in its administration of the two powers: increasingly [relying on] the
section 501 character cancellation power . . . to achieve the removal of
non-citizens deemed to fail the character test,” and diminishing its use of
the criminal deportation power.293 “The criminal deportation power, with
its inbuilt exemption for permanent residents of more than [ten] years
residency, is now very rarely used.”294
This suggests that adding a statute of limitations to any one deportability ground might lead to DHS’s use of alternate grounds to deport. For this reason, it’s necessary to have a statute of limitations that
applies to deportation, rather than any one deportation ground.
VI. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
There are different ways of conceptualizing how a statute of limitations
for deportation might be implemented, depending upon the primary
moral and policy goals to be effectuated. If the goal is to ensure that
noncitizens are protected from deportation after having lived in the
United States for a particular length of time, then one set statute of limitations could apply to all removal grounds. For example, if the time period were ten years, DHS would be barred from initiating removal
proceedings against any noncitizen who had resided in the United States
for ten or more years. Under this model, if a noncitizen committed a deportable crime after ten years presence in the United States, they would
face criminal punishment for the crime, but the government would not be
able to initiate deportation proceedings.295
Critics might characterize an across-the-board statute of limitations as
more of an amnesty than a statute of limitations. This model would effectively immunize noncitizens from deportation after a certain number of
years, regardless of their conduct, making it unlikely to gain substantial
legislative support. While this statute of limitations would effectuate the
goal of ensuring that people are able to move on with their lives and not
have the prospect of deportation hanging over them, there would be
cases where the government was unaware of the person’s unlawful presence. In these cases, the government would not have had an opportunity
to initiate removal proceedings earlier, and it could be said that the
noncitizen’s surreptitious conduct resulted in an unfair advantage. This
could be seen as interfering with the nation’s right to decide who be293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Ten years is the statute of limitations period that was proposed by the President’s
Commission in 1953. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON IMMIGR. & NATURALIZATION, supra
note 28, at 198. It is also the time period Congress uses for cancellation of removal, see 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), and it is the statute of limitations period under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, see William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 § 221, 18 U.S.C. § 1595(c)(1). But five years is also used in the
Immigration and Nationality Act for recission of adjustment of status, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1256(a), and for the civil enforcement statute, see 28 U.S.C. § 2462. Reform bills have
proposed both five and ten years. See supra notes 77–84 and accompanying text.
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comes a member of society. If a noncitizen cannot be deported after a
certain period of time, some might argue that the noncitizen would be
free to break the law in the future without fear of deportation. However,
the noncitizen would never be free to break the law without facing criminal penalties. The noncitizen would not be in a more advantageous situation than a citizen. If a noncitizen were to commit a crime after the
statute of limitations period had run, they would be subject to the criminal law enforcement regime, just like anyone else.
Also, the ability to remain undetected in the United States has been a
metric Congress has utilized in the past. For example, the Immigration
Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 provided an amnesty pathway
to permanent residency and citizenship for those noncitizens who had remained undetected for a particular number of years.296 In order to qualify
for residency, the noncitizen had to prove that they had resided unlawfully in the United States for at least four years.297 Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA)298 and cancellation of removal299 are other
examples of ways in which remaining undetected for a certain length of
time benefits the noncitizen. Therefore, attaching a statute of limitations
to a set number of years that the noncitizen has resided in the United
States would be in keeping with past reform efforts and other areas of
immigration law.
296. Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 § 201, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(a)(2)(A).
297. See id.
298. On June 15, 2012, DHS announced that it would not deport certain undocumented
youth who came to the United States as children. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to
Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15, 2012), https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZRQ-7DTD]. DACA allowed eligible youth and young adults to seek temporary permission to stay in the U.S. called
“deferred action.” See Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA),
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/DACA [https://perma.cc/LE84UZHC]. In order to establish eligibility for DACA, applicants had to show they (1) “[w]ere
under 31 years of age as of June 15, 2012;” (2) came to the United States while under the
age of sixteen; (3) continuously resided in the United States from June 15, 2007, to June 15,
2012; (4) entered the United States without inspection before June 15, 2012, or had their
lawful immigration status expire as of June 15, 2012; (5) “[w]ere physically present in the
United States on June 15, 2012, and at the time of making [the] request for consideration of
deferred action with [ICE]”; (6) “[we]re currently in school, ha[d] graduated . . . from high
school, ha[d] obtained a . . . [GED] certificate, or [had been] honorably discharged” from
the Coast Guard or armed forces; and (7) “[had] not been convicted of a felony [offense],
significant misdemeanor, or three or more other misdemeanors and d[id] not otherwise
pose a threat to national security or public safety.” Id. A federal district court held the
program unlawful in 2021, although an appeal is pending at the time of this Article’s publication. Texas v. United States, 549 F. Supp. 3d 572, 624 (S.D. Tex. 2021) (“DHS violated
the APA with the creation of DACA and its continued operation.”).
299. Cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents provides a defense to removal proceedings and permanent residency if an individual can show that they have resided continuously in the U.S. for at least ten years; have good moral character; have not
been convicted of certain crimes; and their deportation would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to their LPR or U.S. citizen spouse, child, or parent. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(1).
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However, in order to address some of these concerns, Congress could
instead enact two different statute of limitation periods depending upon
whether the government was aware, or could have easily become aware,
of the noncitizen’s deportability. For example, in many cases, the government is fully aware of a noncitizen’s deportable status. This situation
arises when a noncitizen commits any of a myriad of acts resulting in
technical deportability, but the government chooses not to act to commence removal proceedings.300 But in other situations, noncitizens may
enter the United States without detection and remain undetected for
many years. In these situations, the government has not had an opportunity to decide whether to initiate removal proceedings.
In order to address these concerns, I propose two statutes of limitations. For cases in which the government is aware that the individual is
deportable, a five-year statute of limitations would apply. For example,
this would apply when an individual has committed a crime that gives rise
to deportation grounds or when the law changes retroactively and a past
crime would render someone deportable. Another example would be if
an individual has falsely claimed U.S. citizenship for a purpose or benefit
under the INA.301 DHS would have five years from the claim of U.S.
citizenship to initiate deportation proceedings. This would also apply to
noncitizens who were admitted on visas and overstayed (the majority of
the undocumented population).302 Since anyone who was lawfully admitted would have their information entered into the DHS system, DHS
would be aware of anyone who overstays a visa and would be on notice of
deportability, triggering the five-year statute of limitations. Even if DHS
was not actually aware of the individual’s deportability status, the doctrine of constructive knowledge could be used to infer knowledge and
start the clock for purposes of the statute of limitations.303
300. Section 1227 sets forth the deportability grounds. Just a few examples of situations
in which the government would be aware of a person’s deportability include: persons who
were lawfully admitted on visas but overstayed their period of authorized stay, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(1)(B); persons who violate the terms of a nonimmigrant visa, id.; criminal
grounds, id. § 1227(a)(2); and drug abusers, id. § 1227(a)(2)(B).
301. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D).
302. Mark Hugo Lopez, Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Key Facts About the Changing U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Population, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 13, 2021), https://
www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/04/13/key-facts-about-the-changing-u-s-unauthorized-immigrant-population [https://perma.cc/79N7-8AML].
303. In United States v. Are, the district court applied the constructive knowledge doctrine to start the statute of limitations for purposes of a criminal prosecution for being
present in the United States after being deported, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2).
United States v. Are, 431 F. Supp. 2d 842, 843–45 (N.D. Ill. 2006), rev’d, 498 F.3d 460, (7th
Cir. 2007). Because more than five years had passed from the government’s constructive
knowledge of the defendant’s unlawful presence, the court held that the government was
time-barred from bringing an indictment. Id. at 846. However, the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the provision at issue involved an ongoing violation and therefore the
constructive knowledge doctrine was inapplicable. United States v. Are, 498 F.3d 460,
466–47 (7th Cir. 2007). As the Seventh Circuit explained, “The ‘found in’ variation of the
§ 1326(a)(2) crime is a continuing offense; the statute of limitations generally does not
begin to run for continuing offenses until the illegal conduct is terminated.” Id. at 462.
However, as the Seventh Circuit noted, there is a circuit split on this issue. Id. at 466 n.2.
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In cases in which the government was unaware of the individual’s deportability status, the statute of limitations would be ten years. For example, if an individual entered the country without inspection, DHS would
have ten years to initiate deportation proceedings based upon that act.304
Having this longer ten-year statute of limitations would address concerns
that it would be unfair to the government for a statute of limitations to
run while it was unaware of the individual’s deportability. By providing
for an additional five years in such circumstances, this change would allow more time for the government to become aware of the individual’s
unlawful status. While there would still be cases in which the government
would be unaware and the statute of limitations would run out, this tenyear period attempts to strike the right balance between the government’s desire for time and the individual’s need for protection from deportation and stability after ten years. If the individual has not done
anything to bring attention to themselves in ten years, there is no reason
to deport them.
This proposal assumes that the statute of limitations begins to run at
the moment the noncitizen enters the country, giving the government five
or ten years to discover the unlawful presence and initiate removal proceedings, depending upon the circumstances as set forth above. If the
government finds no reason to apprehend the noncitizen in five or ten
years respectively, then that demonstrates that the person poses no danger to society and there is no reason to initiate removal proceedings.
However, a counterargument might be that this would encourage noncitizens to hide out, making them less likely to seek medical care or report
crimes, creating negative societal consequences. Notably however, this
situation would be no different than that which currently exists without a
statute of limitations.
Among the approaches to analyzing statute of limitations questions in “found in” cases
under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2), the Second Circuit rejected the continuing offense interpretation and adopted a “constructive discovery” rule instead when “the deportee reenters by
surreptitious border crossing or using fake documents at the border.” Id. (citing United
States v. Rivera-Ventura, 72 F.3d 277, 281–82 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he ‘found in’ offense is
not a continuing offense but where deportee reenters unlawfully, the crime ‘is not complete until the authorities . . . know, or with the exercise of diligence typical of law enforcement authorities could have discovered, the illegality of his presence.’”)). In contrast, the
Third Circuit rejected the continuing offense interpretation in place of “an ‘actual discovery’ rule for cases in which there is no record of when the deportee reentered.” Id. (citing
United States v. DiSantillo, 615 F.2d 128, 137 (3d Cir. 1980) (If “the entry was surreptitious
and not through an official port of entry, the alien is ‘found’ when his presence is first
noted by the immigration authorities.”)). The Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, without
addressing whether the offense is a continuing one, have held that “a previously deported
alien is ‘found in’ the United States when his physical presence is discovered and noted by
the immigration authorities, and the knowledge of the illegality of his presence, through
the exercise of diligence typical of law enforcement authorities, can reasonably be attributed to the immigration authorities.” Id. (first quoting United States v. Santana-Castellano,
74 F.3d 593, 598 (5th Cir. 1996); then citing United States v. Clarke, 312 F.3d 1343, 1347–48
(11th Cir. 2002); and then citing United States v. Gomez, 38 F.3d 1031, 1037 (8th Cir.
1994)).
304. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6).
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Immigrants’ rights advocates might also have concerns with my proposal, albeit for markedly different reasons. From an advocate’s perspective,
it’s essential to explore the potential for unintended consequences. Along
these lines, if DHS knows that it has a five- or ten-year statute of limitations for removal, this could incentivize the agency to more aggressively
pursue noncitizens for removal, rather than be barred from acting if an
issue arises in the future. But that scenario assumes that DHS has the
resources and capacity to remove all noncitizens whose presence is unauthorized. In reality, DHS discretion and prioritization have long been essential tools in immigration enforcement. Notwithstanding that the
Trump Administration moved away from this past practice and engaged
in heightened numbers of deportations,305 it is not feasible for DHS to
initiate removal proceedings against all noncitizens who are not authorized to be in the United States.306 The Biden Administration has issued
regulations with clear guidelines as to who to prioritize for removal.307
Advocating for a statute of limitations on deportation is intended to
correct an inequity in the law and to bring immigration law more into
conformity with the existing statutes of limitations in civil, criminal, and
administrative law regimes. It would by no means be a substitute for the
desperately needed comprehensive immigration reform. Even if noncitizens were not subject to deportation after a certain number of years,
they would still be living without lawful immigration status and thus excluded from the full protection of the law. For example, undocumented
immigrants are not entitled to purchase health insurance through the exchange under the Affordable Care Act,308 and they did not qualify for the
stimulus payments that helped so many members of the community survive financially through the COVID-19 pandemic.309
Certainly, a more modest proposal would be to attach a statute of limitations to particular deportability grounds. For example, a lawful permanent resident who committed multiple crimes involving moral turpitude
would be deportable only if the government initiated deportation proceedings within a particular amount of time.310 As a practical matter
though, in light of the increasing criminalization of immigration law and
305. John Gramlich, How Border Apprehensions, ICE Arrests and Deportations Have
Changed Under Trump, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 2, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2020/03/02/how-border-apprehensions-ice-arrests-and-deportations-have-changedunder-trump [https://perma.cc/WG5T-8WXG].
306. See Memorandum from Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., to Tae D. Johnson, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Guidelines for the
Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law 2 (Sept. 30, 2021), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/
guidelines-civilimmigrationlaw.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7HP-2RT3].
307. See Johnson Memorandum, supra note 208.
308. Immigrants and the Affordable Care Act (ACA), NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR. (Jan.
2014), https://www.nilc.org/issues/health-care/immigrantshcr [https://perma.cc/EMX8BDPP].
309. See Arijeta Lajka, Immigrants Without Social Security Numbers Are Not Eligible
for Stimulus Checks, AP NEWS (Mar. 11, 2021), https://perma.cc/9XZX-9E7J].
310. Section 1227 presently authorizes deportation for a noncitizen who “is convicted of
two or more crimes involving moral turpitude” “at any time after admission.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).
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heightened use of detention, noncitizens are now ushered through a
seamless path from arrest to deportation.311
As noted above, the question arises as to what happens to noncitizens
who cannot be deported. They would still be without lawful immigration
status or full membership in society. As a temporary measure, the government could exercise its existing discretion to allow for deferred action
and employment authorization in such cases. But ultimately, adding a
statute of limitations back into the immigration law only addresses one
aspect of a much larger problem. Comprehensive immigration reform is
needed in order to provide lawful immigration status for the millions of
noncitizens with long-standing ties to this nation.
With respect to the lifetime bar on immigration benefits for anyone
who ever submitted a frivolous asylum application, my proposed reforms
would reduce this bar to five years. Barring someone who submitted a
fraudulent asylum application from seeking immigration benefits in the
future is akin to a penalty and should be governed by the five-year bar for
civil penalties or forfeitures. If a person has been found to have submitted
a frivolous asylum application, that person would be known to the government, and in all likelihood, deportable. After five years, if DHS hasn’t
moved to initiate deportation proceedings, the statute of limitations on
deportation would attach and the frivolousness bar would be lifted.312
The waiver of due process for individuals that enter through the VWP
would also be limited to five years. When an individual is admitted to the
United States through the VWP, even though they do not have a visa,
their identifying information is entered into DHS’s system. For a period
of five years after the ninety-day VWP admission ends, the individual
would face the bars that attach to those who enter via the VWP. But after
five years, if DHS has not moved to deport the individual, they would be
in the same situation as someone who entered with a visa and overstayed.
Some might argue that doing away with the lifetime ban for due process
undermines the VWP system. The idea behind the VWP is that the individual receives the benefit of being able to enter the United States without having to secure a visa in exchange for waiving certain rights.
However, this would still be the exchange, just not for a lifetime. For five
years, the individual who enters via the VWP has exchanged due process
rights for the ease of admission without a visa.
Finally, as for the judges who rely on dismissed charges to deny bond,
this should also be limited to five years. Again, if five years have passed
311. See generally RANDY CAPPS, MUZAFFAR CHISHTI, JULIA GELATT, JESSICA
BOLTER & ARIEL G. RUIZ SOTO, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., REVVING UP THE DEPORTATION MACHINERY: ENFORCEMENT AND PUSHBACK UNDER TRUMP (2018), https://www.mi
grationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/ImmigrationEnforcement-FullReport-FI
NAL-WEB.pfd [https://perma.cc/G99R-GF2K].
312. While addressing the lifetime bar for aggravated felons is beyond the scope of this
Article, it is another area that needs to be addressed. Just as there is movement to ameliorate some of the barriers that felons face upon reentry to society, the lifetime bar to reentering the United States once convicted of an aggravated felony should also be
ameliorated.
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since charges were dismissed, it should bear no weight in terms of determining danger to the community.
VII. CONCLUSION
Statutes of limitations are deeply embedded in our criminal, civil, and
administrative legal regimes. Until 1952, a statute of limitations existed
under immigration law. At that time, in the midst of the Red Scare and a
general climate of fear, Congress overrode President Truman’s veto to
enact an extremely punitive immigration regime that, inter alia, removed
the statute of limitations on deportation. Immigration law has become
increasingly punitive and criminalized over the years, making the absence
of a statute of limitations even more incongruous with other areas of law.
Even within the immigration regime, time is used to measure an individual’s worthiness for inclusion and the length of enforced periods of exclusion from the nation. It is time to amend the immigration law to restore a
statute of limitations and ensure that no one is judged by one lone act
plucked from the broader context of family ties and membership in society that comes with the passage of time.

416

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

